Why Beijing has become the world’s ‘living room’
China is enjoying the global stage, but there are limits to its influence
Back-to-back state visits to Beijing this month by Russian leader Vladimir Putin and American President Donald Trump have put China in the global spotlight.
For some international analysts, the summits showcased the country as a “stabilizing force capable of hosting two major rivals within days.” Statements such as a “broker between the big powers” and a “pillar of global stability” were also bandied around.
To others, the visits highlighted how China is becoming an “indispensable global power” and Xi Jinping a “world leader to be reckoned with and courted.” Chinese analysts, meanwhile, noted that over the past six months, numerous other world leaders have visited Beijing,
They came from France, Britain, Canada, South Korea and Germany. Crucially, some returned after long gaps. It was the first visit in eight years by a UK prime minister, for example. And the first visit in nine years for a Canadian, South Korean and American leader.
China card
With all these visits happening one after another, Chinese media described the Beijing as an international “living room” that provides stability in a turbulent world. Another headline read, “The world is entering Beijing time.”
While this has undeniably been a big moment for China, these interpretations miss three key points. First, it is unclear whether world leaders are visiting Beijing because of proactive diplomacy or as a way of gaining leverage in dealings with the Trump administration.
For example, when Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney visited in January, it was widely interpreted as a response to Canada’s dependence on the US and Trump’s administration. Some media said he was playing the “China card” to negotiate better terms with Washington.
Second, Beijing sets a high “entry price” for visits to its “living room.” Occasionally, these summits have been linked to major policy shifts by visiting dignitaries.
When Trump visited Beijing, for instance, he backtracked on earlier calls to block Chinese nationals from buying farmland in the US and to impose limits on the number of students from China at universities in the United States.
Chinese media highlighted the negative reactions these concessions got from Trump’s MAGA base and other Republicans in the US. Similarly, Carney’s visit resulted in a trade deal reducing tariffs on made-in-China electric vehicles to 6.1% for the first 49,000 cars annually.
In 2024, Canada had imposed a 100% tariff on Chinese EVs. Months later, during the 2025 election, Carney called China the biggest threat “from a geopolitical sense.”
His concession on EVs drew criticism at home. Politicians warned it would invite a “flood of cheap Chinese electric vehicles,” without guarantees of investment in Canada’s economy.
Material support
Finally, these visits by foreign leaders have clearly not changed Beijing’s core foreign policy positions. The appeals of European leaders did not, for example, change China’s material support for Russia’s war in Ukraine.
Nor did they reduce China’s large trade surplus with the European Union. Similarly, Beijing did not agree to assist the Trump administration on Iran, despite the US president’s praise for Xi’s leadership and his decision to pause a weapons sale to Taiwan.
And even Putin failed to resolve disagreements over the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, a project long sought by Moscow. If built, the pipeline could carry 50 billion cubic meters of Russian natural gas annually to China, or about 12% of its gas use in 2025.
The influx of international leaders to China may instead be a reflection of growing uncertainty in the global order. The dramatic shifts in American foreign policy under Trump have prompted a great deal of concern among Washington’s traditional allies.
It has also provided an opportunity for Beijing to project itself as a stable partner after years of pursuing a more aggressive, wolf-warrior diplomacy. But these visits do not prove its diplomatic efforts have become more effective.
Domestic economic pressures and competing international priorities still limit what China can realistically deliver. For example, to prevent factory closures and meet growth targets, Beijing channels massive state subsidies into certain manufacturing sectors.
This creates surplus output that is exported globally – including to the EU – at artificially low prices. China can’t afford to rein these exports in.
Global leadership
At the same time, it has continued to support Russia and Iran in challenging the US and Europe’s security, despite the importance of Western markets to China’s economy. As a result, high-profile meetings in Beijing produce ceremony and pomp, but deliver limited outcomes.
These recent visits by Trump, Putin and other world leaders have certainly made China appear more central to global diplomacy. But this visibility does not necessarily translate into effective global leadership.
Czeslaw Tubilewicz is a Senior Lecturer in theDepartment of Politics and International Relations at Adelaide University in Australia.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of China Factor.