Quad pod still has a vital role to play against China

Analysts have tried to make sense of American President Donald Trump’s administration with countless, sometimes contradictory, labels. He’s isolationist and transactional. He’s a populist. Or, more recently, a neoconservative.

One way to make sense of both him and the broader state of geopolitics at the moment is to understand the difference between structure and agency. Trump has undoubtedly exercised his agency in expansive ways since beginning his second term.

Yet, at the same time, he has been constrained by structural limitations. The Supreme Court’s ruling against his Liberation Day tariffs is one example. Another is the US Congress’ release of the Epstein files.

Even Trump’s fiercest boosters will admit that he is, like his predecessors who also sought to expand executive powers, limited by the United States constitution and its stipulation of three co-equal branches of government.

The same goes for foreign policy. Trump can berate allies, implement tariffs and withdraw from international institutions, but he can’t alter certain structural realities. This is helpful in making sense of the way his actions are impacting American alliances and partnerships.

Military buildup

This week, the foreign ministers of the four nations in the so-called “Quad” – the United States, Australia, Japan and India – met in New Delhi. The leaders of these nations, however, haven’t gathered for a summit since 2024, when Joe Biden was president.

India was meant to host last year, but a summit never came together. It’s unclear if one will happen this year, either. This has prompted much handwringing. Critics are saying the Quad is drifting “towards irrelevance” and “on the brink of extinction.”

Yet, as much as the leaders of the four nations have exercised their agency in distinct ways – including, at times, changing the trajectory of the Quad to be less ambitious – the structural dynamics in the Indo-Pacific remain unchanged.

China’s rapid military buildup has altered the strategic calculations of the region for the foreseeable future. Extensive maritime aggression, economically destabilizing practices, ‘wolf warrior’ diplomacy, and violent border clashes have only added to rising tensions.

This is why, before the Trump administration took office last year, the four Quad nations dramatically expanded the group’s scope and ambitions. The members agreed to cooperate on everything from fighting cancer to developing vaccines to enhancing cyber security.

They declared at their last leaders’ summit:

…[the] Quad countries have built a vital and enduring regional grouping that will buttress the Indo-Pacific for decades to come.

This is not to say there hasn’t been challenges. No single issue has been as problematic for Quad ambitions in the second Trump administration than US-India ties.

For decades, American presidents have all touted the importance of a powerful, independent and democratic India to the country’s national interests. In their view, India served as a helpful counterbalance to China in the Indo-Pacific.

It was the first Trump administration, after all, that resuscitated the Quad in 2017. The group was originally formed in 2007, but fell apart soon after that. Trump also befriended Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi during his first term.

Loyal friends

He called him “one of America’s most loyal friends.” But since 2025, relations have soured due to Trump’s immigration crackdown, his tariffs on India, and tensions over New Delhi’s purchases of Russian oil, as well as his growing closeness with Pakistan.

And after a testy exchange between Trump and Modi over the phone last June, Trump reportedly cancelled his plans to travel to India for the summit.

Beijing has been opposed to the Quad since its inception, accusing the four democratic members of encirclement, engaging in a Cold War mentality and antagonising China. It said it would accelerate its own military modernization in response.

After the Quad disbanded in 2008 – for reasons that remain debated – one US scholar argued: “The Quad came down and China did exactly what it said it was going to do if the Quad persisted.” Unsurprisingly, China has continued to oppose the Quad since it regrouped.

It still sees the group the same way the members envisioned it – as a counterbalance to China. At this week’s foreign ministers’ meeting in India, Quad members agreed to build a port in Fiji, increase critical minerals cooperation and expand maritime cooperation.

Beijing wasn’t impressed. Almost immediately after the meeting ended, Chinese state media ran a story with the headline, “Beijing blasts exclusive cliques after Quad meeting.” Public opinion in the four Quad countries also shows firm backing for the alignment.

Our polling at the the University of Sydney in 2025 found there was correct support for the Quad becoming a formal military alliance. Australians were the most supportive (49% agree), followed by Indians (44%), Americans (42%) and Japanese respondents (41%).

Only a small number of respondents opposed the group becoming a formal military alliance – from between seven to 15%. The rest either didn’t know or were unsure.

Revisionist agenda

Cooperation among the Quad members is continuing to expand and deepen, as well. With every passing year, they are engaging in an increasing number of military exercises, humanitarian and disaster assistance activities, and maritime cooperation efforts.

The individual leaders of the four nations will continue to change. And they will at times have significant reservations about each other. Yet China’s destabilizing behavior gives the Quad members few alternatives in counterbalancing Beijing’s revisionist agenda.

Jared Mondschein is the Director of Research for the US Studies Center at the University of Sydney in Australia.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of China Factor.