Vietnam President To Lam is not the ‘new Xi Jinping’
His authority ‘remains constrained by collective leadership and Communist Party consensus’
To Lam now leads Vietnam on two fronts – as both the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam and state President. His concurrent leadership is unprecedented in Vietnam, prompting some analysts to draw comparisons with Chinese President Xi Jinping.
Crictics allege that by holding the offices of both Party leader and head of state, Lam is undermining the “four-pillar” balance of power, where authority is shared among the General Secretary, President, Prime Minister and Chairman of the National Assembly.
But the parallel is misleading. Vietnam’s Politburo and Central Committee are far more influential than their Chinese counterparts. Unlike Xi, Vietnam’s collective structure means that Lam cannot rule alone or without strong support across the Party and government.
In comparison, Xi’s entrenchment of power is far deeper than Lam’s and extends beyond what is currently possible within the Communist Party of Vietnam.
Decisive shift
In 2016, Xi was designated the “core leader” of the Chinese Communist Party. In 2018, the National People’s Congress removed the two-term limit on the presidency.
Xi has since bypassed the Politburo, using its Standing Committee to expedite decision-making, while his policy statements have been enshrined as Xi Jinping Thought.
That has put him on a par with Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping and is a decisive shift from China’s post-Mao collective leadership. Xi has a personalistic top-down hierarchy and permission to rule for life.
His use of the Politburo Standing Committee has confined decision-making to a small inner circle while Xi Jinping Thought has become orthodox Party ideology.
Still, Lam’s concurrent election to General Secretary and President for a five-year term is unprecedented in Vietnam’s post-war history. Previously, when a leader held both posts, it was only in a caretaker capacity.
But unlike Xi, Lam’s dual role as Party leader and head of state does not undermine Vietnam’s collective leadership. The “four-pillar” structure, while a long-standing feature of Vietnamese politics, is a heuristic concept that is not grounded in constitutional law or Party statutes.
Indeed, last year he elevated the post of Permanent Member of the Secretariat as the “fifth pillar.” His authority rests not on eclipsing the collective leadership, but on his seniority, his vision for the future and support of the Central Committee and the National Assembly.
Vietnam’s Politburo and Central Committee represent a regional balance of power, each composed of provincial factions from the north, center and south, buttressed by members from interest groups such as the military and the Ministry of Public Security.
Enormous powers
Of particular note is the rise of the Hung Yen faction – natives of Hung Yen province – led by Lam. Its members occupy key leadership positions across Party and state apparatus. This facilitates quick decision-making and policy implementation.
Lam is sometimes referred to as “hat nhan,” or nucleus, in the Vietnamese media. But this is not an official designation and does not carry the same cachet that “core leader” does for Xi. The Party in Vietnam has its own code based on a legacy of collective decision-making.
While the state constitution gives the president enormous powers, Lam cannot exercise them without prior approval from the Politburo and Central Committee. Even then, the National Assembly must agree to approve the president’s recommendations.
Upon assuming the position of General Secretary, Lam proclaimed that Vietnam was entering an “era of national rise.” As the caretaker General Secretary during 2024-25, he initiated a far-reaching reform program, streamlining Party, state, legislative and provincial institutions.
The key drivers behind the reforms are economic development and international integration.
Lam inherited one of the fastest growing economies in the world. But if Vietnam fails to move up the production chain, it risks falling into the middle-income trap. To avoid this fate, Lam is firmly committed to the goal set by the 14th National Party Congress in January.
It stated that Vietnam should “become a developing country with modern industry and high middle-income status by 2030.” The main driving forces will be “science, technology, innovation and digital transformation.”
While the full text of the resolution is unavailable, Lam stated that it positions “international integration as a crucial driver propelling the country into a new era.” His views strengthening national defence and foreign relations are deemed “crucial and constant” tasks.
Strategic partners
Under Lam’s leadership, Vietnam has expanded its comprehensive strategic partners from six to 15. He visited 24 countries between July 2024 and June 2026 to elicit their support for Vietnam’s rise, including a trip to Beijing in April.
Lam is not an analogue of China’s “president for life.” The Politburo and Central Committee are more influential than their Chinese counterparts because of their operational code. In sum, Lam is primus inter pares or first among equals in Vietnam’s leadership structure.
Carl Thayer is an Emeritus Professor at the Australian Defense Force Academy at the University of New South Wales in Canberra.
This edited article is republished from East Asia Forum under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article here.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of China Factor.