Spy alarm spooks China’s relations with North Korea

Chinese authorities in the northeast city of Shenyang reportedly arrested a North Korean IT specialist last month, accusing him of stealing drone technology secrets.

The suspect, apparently linked to the country’s main missile development agency, was part of a wider network operating in China, according to the story, which first appeared in South Korea’s Yonhap News Agency.

In response, Pyongyang was said to have recalled IT personnel in China.

The story was later circulated by several Chinese online outlets. Given the tight censorship in China, this implies a degree of tacit editorial approval from Beijing – although some sites later deleted the report.

Reacting to the Yonhap alert, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson noted that North Korea and China were “friendly neighbors” that maintained “normal” personnel exchanges, without denying the details.

The incident suggests a rare semipublic spat between the two communist countries, contradicting the image of China and North Korea as “brothers in arms.”

Primary patron

There are even signs that Beijing is growing frustrated with Pyongyang – not least over North Korea’s increasing closeness with Moscow. Such a development challenges China’s traditional role as the country’s primary patron.

In short, the arrest could be a symptom of worsening ties. North Korea has long been seen by Beijing as both a strategic security buffer and within its sphere of influence.

From China’s perspective, allowing a hostile force to gain control of the peninsula – and especially the north – could open the door to future military threats. This fear partly explained why China intervened during the Korean War between 1950 and 1953.

Beyond security, North Korea also serves as an ideological ally. Both countries are run by communist parties. Even today, Chinese state media continues to highlight the bonds of “comradeship” with Pyongyang.

Yet, North Korea’s nuclear ambitions have caused concern in Beijing. It has conducted multiple tests since 2006 and is now believed to possess nuclear weapons capable of targeting South Korea, Japan and United States bases in the region.

China supports a denuclearized and stable Korean peninsula – both for regional peace and economic growth. Like the US, Japan and South Korea, China opposes nuclear proliferation, fearing these tests could provoke US military action or trigger an arms race in the region.

Meanwhile, Washington and its allies continue to pressure Beijing to do more to rein in a neighbor it often views as a vassal state of China.

Given its economic ties with the US and Washington’s East Asian allies, it has every reason to avoid further instability from Pyongyang. Yet to North Korea’s isolationist rulers, nuclear weapons are vital for the regime’s survival and independence.

What is more, nuclear weapons can also limit Beijing’s influence. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un worries that without that leverage, China could try to interfere in the internal affairs of his country.

After the death of Kim’s father, Kim Jong Il, in 2011, Beijing was thought to favor Kim Jong Un’s elder half-brother Kim Jong Nam as successor – possibly prompting Kim Jong Un to have him assassinated in 2017.

Economic aid

But despite ongoing tensions over the nuclear issue, China has continued to support the North Korean regime for strategic reasons.

For decades, Beijing has been Pyongyang’s top trading partner, providing crucial economic aid. In 2023, China accounted for about 98% of North Korea’s official trade and continued to supply food and fuel to keep the regime afloat.

Yet during the past few years, more imports, notably oil, have come from another source – Russia. Pyongyang and Moscow had been close allies during the Cold War, but ties cooled after the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s.

More recently, a shared hostility toward the US and the West in general has brought the two nations closer.

Moscow’s international isolation following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine and its deteriorating ties with South Korea in particular have pushed it toward Pyongyang. North Korea has reportedly supplied large quantities of ammunition to Russia during the Ukraine war.

Though both governments deny the arms trade – banned under United Nations sanctions – North Korea is thought to have received fuel, food and access to Russian military and space technology in return.

Last year, Russian forces were using around 10,000 shells per day in Ukraine, with half sourced from North Korea. Some front-line units were reportedly using North Korean ammunition for up to 60% of their firepower.

High-level visits have also increased. In 2023, Russia’s Defense Minister Andrey Belousov visited Pyongyang for the 70th anniversary of the Korean War armistice, followed by Kim Jong Un’s visit to Russia in September for a summit with President Vladimir Putin.

Last year, Putin visited Pyongyang, where the two countries signed a comprehensive strategic cooperation agreement, including a pledge that each would come to the other’s aid if attacked.

Soon after, North Korea began sending troops to support Russia. Intelligence from the US, South Korea and Ukraine indicates that Pyongyang deployed 10,000 to 12,000 soldiers in late 2023, marking its first involvement in a major conflict since the Korean War.

Financial gain

They reportedly receive at least US$2,000 per month plus a bonus.

For Pyongyang, this move not only provides financial gain but also combat experience should war reignite on the Korean Peninsula.

China, too, has remained on friendly terms with Russia since the war in Ukraine began. So why would it feel uneasy about the growing closeness between Pyongyang and Moscow?

For starters, Beijing views Pyongyang’s outreach to Moscow as a challenge to its traditional role as North Korea’s main patron. While still dependent on Chinese aid, North Korea appears to be seeking greater autonomy.

The strengthening of Russia-North Korea ties also fuels Western fears of an “axis of upheaval” involving all three countries.

Unlike North Korea’s confrontational stance toward the West and its neighbor to the south, Beijing has offered limited support to Moscow during the Ukraine war and is cautious not to appear part of a trilateral alliance.

Behind this strategy is a desire on behalf of China to maintain stable relations with the US, Europe and key Asian neighbors such as Japan and South Korea. Doing so may be the best way for Beijing to protect its economic and diplomatic interests.

China is also concerned that with Moscow’s support in nuclear and missile technologies, Pyongyang may act more provocatively — through renewed nuclear tests or military clashes with South Korea. And this would only destabilize the region.

The timing of the alleged spy drama may offer further clues regarding the state of relations.

It came just a day after North Korea officially confirmed it had deployed troops to aid the Russian war effort. It also announced plans to erect a monument in Pyongyang honoring its soldiers who died in the Ukraine war.

The last spy case like this was in 2016 when Chinese authorities arrested a North Korean citizen in the border city of Dandong. It reportedly followed Pyongyang informing China that it would permanently pursue its nuclear weapons program.

Critical buffer

The relationship deteriorated further when North Korea successfully tested a hydrogen bomb in 2016, prompting Beijing to back UN Security Council sanctions against Pyongyang.

Again, this time North Korea shows little sign of bending to China’s will. Last month, Kim oversaw missile launches from North Korea’s first 5,000-ton destroyer. None of which will help ease Beijing’s concerns.

While China still sees Pyongyang as a critical buffer against US influence in Northeast Asia, an increasingly provocative North Korea, fueled by a growing relationship with Russia, is starting to look less like a strategic asset – and more like a liability.

Linggong Kong is a Ph.D. candidate in political science at Auburn University in the United States.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of China Factor.