Japan’s quiet break with pacifism is growing louder 

For most donor countries, foreign aid has always encompassed a spectrum – from socio-economic development and humanitarian aid to military assistance. But Japan was the rare exception for decades. 

Since launching its aid program in 1954, it maintained a nearly 70-year record of providing assistance with no military element. Yet this posture has shifted. After the World War II, Japan sought reintegration into the global community by projecting a “peace-loving” image. 

Official Development Assistance, or ODA, helped establish this reputation and dispel the negative image associated with the country’s imperialism. Its non-military principle functioned as a quasi-constitutional constraint .

It was based alongside doctrines like the Three Non-Nuclear Principles and the Three Principles on Arms Exports announced in 1967, as well as its exclusively defense-oriented policy or “senshu boei.”

In 2023, that posture shifted when the Fumio Kishida administration introduced the Official Security Assistance, or OSA, to a revised National Security Strategy. 

Foreign policy

It signaled Japan’s transformation from a peace-loving nation into a proactive contributor to peace. The new framework effectively opened the door to military aid – marking a decisive break from Japan’s traditional foreign policy model.

OSA is a grant-based plan providing Japan-made defense equipment to “like-minded countries,” or states that share Tokyo’s security concerns about an increasingly assertive and aggressive China. 

It aims to strengthen deterrence capabilities and shape a favorable regional security environment. 

The logic is clear. With China enjoying a nearly five-to-one advantage in GDP, six-to-one in defense spending and eight-to-one in active military personnel, Japan alone cannot sustain deterrence through its own military build-up.

Policymakers designed OSA with caution, seeking to ease domestic anxieties about eroding pacifism, manage security dilemmas with China and blunt Beijing’s remilitarization narrative. The backlash has been minimal. 

Domestically, only the Japanese Communist Party and some non-governmental organizations voiced opposition. Abroad, while China’s state media denounced what it called “remilitarization,” the criticism was expected and limited. 

Southeast Asian governments raised no formal concerns as poll data continues to rank Japan the region’s most trusted major power. Still, restraint comes at a cost. Providing small quantities of non-lethal gear can do little to bolster like-minded nations’ deterrence capacity.  

So, OSA also seeks to tighten security cooperation with foreign militaries and coast guards. It offers a layered approach that includes defense equipment transfers from Japanese arms manufacturers and Defense Capacity Building Assistance. 

The Philippines demonstrates this. Its coast guard received large patrol vessels through ODA, while the Armed Forces received coastal and air-surveillance radars through OSA. Two forces could accelerate the evolution of this policy. 

Security cooperation

The first is the changing US posture under President Donald Trump. His transactional approach to allies and the sidelining of Asia under the ‘Donroe Doctrine’ undermine alliance credibility, leaving a strategic vacuum that invites Chinese adventurism. 

This pressures Japan to demonstrate greater self-reliance and elevate its security cooperation with like-minded countries to a quasi-alliance level. 

Another potential catalyst is domestic politics, where Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s historic landslide electoral victory has given the Liberal Democratic Party overwhelming legislative power to pass nearly any law or budget.

The Takaichi government listed the defense industry as a pillar of its economic growth strategy and has already announced plans to raise the 2026 OSA budget to 18.1 billion yen, or US$116 million. 

The LDP also proposed abolishing the restrictions under the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment. This would enable the provision of almost all weapons under OSA. 

Officials could also introduce loan schemes via the Japan Bank for International Cooperation for major weapons too costly for grant-based OSA. Like-minded countries could potentially buy high-end weapons like submarines – one of Japan’s few clear technological strengths. 

What began as a cautious experiment could soon grow into fully-fledged military aid. The strategic challenge lies in expanding OSA without escalating rivalry with China.

Takaichi’s November remarks that a Taiwan contingency could constitute a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan have already irritated Beijing. 

Any move to expand OSA into a form of “normal” military aid without clear limits risks provoking Chinese military activities, potentially drawing Japan into regional conflicts.

Crisis management

For this reason, the expansion of OSA should be accompanied by parallel diplomatic efforts. Tokyo should take the lead in establishing a multilateral crisis management framework in the East and South China Sea that includes Beijing. 

The balance between deterrence and risk management will determine whether Japan’s new aid policy stabilizes the region – or deepens its divides.

Hiroaki Shiga is a Professor in the Graduate School of International Social Sciences at  Yokohama National University. 

This edited article is republished from East Asia Forum under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article here. 

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of China Factor.