Taiwan sifts through strategic lessons of Iran war

Strikes by the United States and Israeli on Iran have become increasingly concerning for the world due to the risks of further escalation and the impact on energy markets. Yet in Taiwan, the focus has shifted in a different direction.

Rather than treating the war as geographically distant, Taiwanese leaders and analysts are viewing it as a real-time indicator of how Washington operates under strategic pressure.

The key question is less about whether the US would act if a conflict with China were to break out in the Indo-Pacific region, and more about how it would manage competing pressures if multiple crises unfolded at once.

There is growing recognition in Taiwan that American resources are not unlimited. The Middle East war has caused energy prices to fluctuate and stoked fears of rising inflation in the US, demonstrating the domestic costs of military operations.

President Donald Trump’s approval ratings have also taken a hit, with some in his own party now questioning his rationale for going to war. Some reports have indicated American supplies of interceptor missiles are running low.

Under strain

The US military has, for example, had to move some THAAD missile interceptors from South Korea to the Middle East. It has also struggled to defend against Iran’s use of asymmetrical fighting tactics.

This has direct implications for the deterrence Washington has long maintained in the Indo-Pacific. It depends not only on US war-fighting capability, but on the expectation this capability will remain intact under strain.

Conflicts elsewhere may not weaken American resolve to intervene if China were to invade or pressure Taiwan in some fashion. But they can drain American resources and influence where these items are prioritized.

The US has also framed its strikes on Iran as a “preventive” action aimed at mitigating a future threat rather than responding to an imminent attack. This raises broader questions about the changing threshold for the use of force in the Indo-Pacific.

For Taiwan, this is not an abstract notion.

If the threshold for military action is lowered from imminent threat to potential risk, the strategic environment becomes less predictable in the region. This broadens the range of circumstances under which force by the US may be justified.

The speed with which the Trump administration has acted in Iran has also increased uncertainty for regional partners like Japan and South Korea in assessing when and how the US would act against China.

Washington’s NATO partners were not told about the Iran strikes before they happened. This could make Japan and South Korea similarly worried about a lack of communication on potential American actions over Taiwan.

The Iran war has also raised broader questions about how the US adapts as crises evolve. Much of the discussion around the island democracy has traditionally centered on the possibility of a large-scale Chinese invasion.

Political conditions

But recent developments suggest escalation may be less linear than this. Rather than following a single, predictable pathway, conflicts can develop through a sequence of smaller decisions, or rapidly changing political conditions.

This has contributed to a shift in strategic discussion. Defense policy debates and security forums have increasingly examined scenarios in which China pressured Taiwan with grey-zone tactics, blockades and incremental escalatory moves, rather than a full-scale invasion.

As a result, attention is shifting to how such pressure might build over time – through cyber operations, maritime restrictions or limited military actions – and spiral out of control.

The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz has been watched closely in Taipei as an example of how disruption of a strategic chokepoint can quickly impact the world.

This raises questions about whether similar dynamics could emerge in the Taiwan Strait, and how prepared external actors – including the US – would be to respond.

The American military has also been unable to prevent the Iran war from spilling over into the Persian Gulf states. This raises questions about whether a war over Taiwan could be contained or produce wider regional effects.

For Taipei, the immediate challenge comes from how China interprets US actions in Iran.

If Beijing concludes that diminishing military resources or domestic pressures would limit the ability of the US to wage a sustained conflict in the Indo-Pacific, it may reassess the risks of applying coercive pressure on Taiwan.

This does not imply immediate conflict is likely. But it increases the chances that China would try to pressure or coerce Taiwan just below the threshold of full-scale war.

History suggests that escalation is often shaped by how situations are interpreted by adversaries, rather than by clear shifts in power. When states believe conditions are more favorable than they actually are, the risk of misjudgment increases.

Possible threats

For Taiwan, the challenge is therefore not only to assess developments in the Middle East, but to ensure that its own position is not misunderstood. This involves:

• Maintaining credible defensive capabilities.
• Reinforcing internal cohesion against possible threats.
• Signaling clearly that any attempt at coercion would face robust resistance.

Deterrence depends not only on what a country can do, but what others believe it will do — and whether those beliefs discourage risk-taking.

Bonnie Yushih Liao is an Assistant Professor of Diplomacy & International Relations at the Tamkang University in Taiwan.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of China Factor.