Social debate divide fuels Japan-China friction

Relations between Japan and China have entered a distinctly colder phase following the re-election of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi last month. But the real shift in bilateral ties is unfolding in Japanese homes and streets. 

Everyday encounters increasingly shape public perceptions and tether Tokyo’s foreign policy to domestic social debates. Bilateral relations have been tense since the formation of the First Takaichi Cabinet last year. 

Her remarks in the Diet that a use of force by China against Taiwan could potentially create an “existential crisis” in Japan created a stir in Beijing. Political tension has since spilled over into the sphere of people-to-people dialogue.

According to the Japan National Tourism Organisation, the number of Chinese visitors to the country fell by 45% in December and 60% in January compared to the previous year. This sharp decline may appear disastrous for Japan’s economy.

But the domestic reaction is more nuanced. Some local communities and businesses in the country have expressed a sense of relief, noting that they no longer need to worry about the “disruptive behaviour” often associated with large tour groups. 

Public poll

Such sentiments highlight a critical shift although this cooling of sentiment is hardly unprecedented. 

Three major events – the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident, the 2005 anti-Japanese demonstrations and the 2012 escalation of disputes over the Senkaku or Diaoyu Islands – have left lasting imprints on the Japanese psyche. 

The Cabinet Office’s 2025 public poll underscored this fragility, showing that only 16% of respondents felt affinity towards China. By contrast, 68% viewed Japan-Taiwan relations positively in a survey conducted by the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office. 

But a monolithic view of China no longer exists in Japan. Perceptions vary drastically across generations. Older Japanese tend to follow Chinese politics through traditional media, viewing the nation as an assertive security threat. 

In contrast, younger people are increasingly drawn to Chinese grassroots culture, as typified by the craze for Labubu dolls and the ubiquitous influence of TikTok. 

This generational divide suggests that, beneath the frosty political surface, there remains fertile ground for grassroots rapport, provided it is not stifled by geopolitical rhetoric. A primary obstacle to this is the modern information ecosystem. 

While conventional media in Japan increasingly frames China as a “threat,” social media has become a breeding ground for misinformation and outright propaganda. A sobering example is the 2023 controversy over Japan’s discharge of treated Fukushima water. 

Disinformation campaigns severely harmed bilateral perceptions, illustrating how digital platforms can exacerbate historical grievances and hinder mutually favourable views. The perception gap regarding history remains another fundamental hurdle. 

Territorial sensitivities

Many Japanese struggle to understand why Takaichi’s remarks on Taiwan are seen as provocative in Beijing, largely because the public often views the island as a separate entity from their conception of China. 

Without a shared framework for these historical and territorial sensitivities, even benign cultural exchanges are vulnerable to political shocks. The most significant transformation is the internalisation of Japan’s borders. 

Chinese people are no longer primarily individuals encountered during overseas travel – they are tourists, students, workers and migrants in the local neighbourhood. 

Yet according to the Sasakawa Peace Foundation’s 2025 survey on Japanese attitudes towards China, 82% of respondents are acutely aware of the influx of Chinese tourists. But this drops sharply regarding the lives of these individuals once they settle in Japan.

Notably, few are aware of the “Run-ri” migrants – Chinese citizens who oppose the Communist Party’s authoritarian rule and seek freedom in Japan. These represent a new facet of the bilateral relationship – the Chinese diaspora as a domestic social issue in the country. 

As Japan continues to bring global issues into its domestic space, its approach to China is becoming inseparable from its internal social policies. 

In February’s House of Representatives election, political parties advocating more restrictive policies towards foreign residents also supported tougher stances towards Beijing. 

According to the Sasakawa Peace Foundation’s survey, Japanese citizens who favour mutually beneficial relationships with foreigners at home are also more likely to support cooperative, “win-win” approaches to Tokyo-Beijing relations. 

Digital spaces

The future of Japan’s ties with China will not be decided solely in the halls of power, but in the streets of Ginza, the classrooms of Japanese universities and the digital spaces where young people interact. 

Moving forward, Japan must navigate the tension between the “threat” perceived by the state and the “culture” embraced by the people, acknowledging that the most potent diplomatic encounters are now happening at home. 

Japan’s future approach to China will increasingly depend on how society negotiates diversity within its borders, creating a resilient foundation for mutual understanding.

Shigeto Sonoda is a Professor at the Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia at the University of Tokyo. 

This edited article is republished from East Asia Forum under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article here.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of China Factor.