Ports in a storm fueling China’s maritime expansion

Last month, the Panamanian government took control of two ports in the Panama Canal that had been operated by a Hong Kong conglomerate for two decades. The move is the latest in a long-simmering legal battle.

Far from just a local dispute, the episode has drawn in the United States and China, whose competition over global ports and trade routes has intensified including in the crucial Panama Canal Zone. Beijing’s presence has repeatedly drawn the ire of the Trump administration.

Chinese firms now own or operate terminals at more than 90 ports worldwide, including many of the busiest. The network spans Africa, Europe, the Middle East and Asia, with growing activity in South America.

The scale has also fueled a heated debate over whether these investments are purely commercial or serve broader strategic goals.

Much of it has relied on case studies and politicized headlines, including in the Panama Canal case. But understanding where these ports are located, is important given that disruptions to global shipping lanes can reverberate across the world economy.

In a recent study, we analyzed 133 coastal countries to understand why some host Chinese port investments while others do not. We found that its overseas expansion is not random.

Shipping corridors

Far from being driven primarily by general business climate measures, the investments cluster near maritime chokepoints and piracy-prone shipping corridors. More modest evidence revealed that resource-rich countries are also more likely to host these ports.

Some sea routes are more important than others. The Suez Canal, the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca are examples of chokepoints – arteries through which large volumes of global trade and energy shipments must pass.

In our findings, nations near chokepoints, such as Panama or countries bordering the Dover Strait, such as France, were substantially more likely to host a Chinese-affiliated port. Put simply, proximity to critical trade bottlenecks predicts Chinese investments.

This makes economic sense. China depends heavily on maritime trade to sustain economic growth. And ports near chokepoints sit along the world’s most sensitive shipping corridors and offer long-term commercial access in strategic locations.

Despite concerns in the West that Beijing is developing ports for military reasons, not every one is a naval base in disguise.

China-linked ports tend to cluster around chokepoints

Most Chinese-affiliated facilities are commercial terminals. Yet the infrastructure can still have strategic value. China’s first overseas military logistics base in Djibouti sits alongside the Chinese-operated Doraleh port complex.

A report from the Congressional Research Service noted that the facility supports naval operations and regional access in the western Indian Ocean.

That does not make other Chinese-owned or operated ports military installations. But control over terminals, logistics platforms, and supply chain data can shape economic and security relationships over time.

The same corridors in which Beijing is concentrating its investment are also hot spots for maritime crime. In separate research, we found that seaports can facilitate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing when oversight is weak.

Our latest findings show that Chinese-affiliated ports are more common in countries already experiencing piracy and maritime insecurity. That overlap does not mean they cause illicit activity, but it shows these investments often occur in higher-risk environments.

Piracy levels

One of the most surprising findings from our study was the relationship between piracy and investment. Between 1991 and 2018, thousands of incidents were recorded worldwide.

But rather than avoiding risky waters, Chinese-affiliated ports are more common in countries experiencing higher levels of piracy.

Why invest in unstable corridors? One explanation is that piracy signals where trade routes are both vulnerable and valuable.

Investing in ports in areas such as the Gulf of Guinea or parts of Southeast Asia may help Beijing protect its shipping interests. In this sense, piracy may signal not just risk but a major opportunity.

We also examined natural resource wealth of nations using a broad measure that includes minerals and agricultural products.

The importance of chokepoints

We found evidence that countries with higher resource levels were more likely to host at least one Chinese-affiliated port, though this relationship was not consistent across all models.

Some commonly cited explanations as to where and why China invests did not hold up in our analysis. Broad measures of business climate and governance were not consistent predictors of Chinese-affiliated port presence.

This suggests that geography and maritime risk factors may matter more than general economic or governance indicators.

Whatever the motivations behind Beijing’s investments, the implications extend beyond local trade and logistics. Ports are no longer just local infrastructure projects. They are nodes in global supply chains and increasingly in geopolitical competition.

And while not every investment signals a covert military ambition, it would be naive to treat all port projects as politically neutral. Recent policy responses by the United States tend to reflect these growing concerns.

Key facilities

Earlier this year, the White House outlined a plan to strengthen the American shipping industry and reduce reliance on foreign-controlled maritime infrastructure.

The administration has also taken a closer look at foreign involvement in key facilities in the Western Hemisphere, including ports linked to the Panama Canal.

Such moves suggest that control is no longer viewed in Washington as just a commercial issue but increasingly as a matter of economic and national security.

And as the map of countries with Chinese-affiliated ports suggests, Beijing’s investments are following the world’s most consequential trade routes not by accident, but by design.

Dylan Spencer is an Assistant Professor of Criminology at Georgia Southern University. Gohar Petrossian is a Professor of Criminal Justice at John Jay College of Criminal Justice. Stephen Pires is an Associate Professor of Criminal Justice at Florida International University

This edited article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of China Factor.