Wang’s ‘Wolf Warrior’ howls erupt over Japan’s stance

Beijing has turned the page on its aggressive diplomatic posturing – except when it comes to Tokyo

China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi delivered a rebuke of what he said were dangerous trends of militarism in Japan at the Munich Security Conference last weekend.

In a panel discussion, he pointed out comments made in November by the Japanese Prime Minister, Sanae Takaichi, in which she suggested Tokyo could intervene militarily in the event of a Chinese attack on Taiwan.

Wang stressed the remarks were a direct challenge to China’s national sovereignty, suggesting this was not acceptable. He warned of a “very dangerous development in Asia,” adding that Japanese people “should not let far-right extremists drag them down.”

Some observers have suggested that his remarks indicate a return to Beijing’s “Wolf Warrior” approach to diplomacy – an assertive and jingoistic foreign policy strategy that was adopted by Chinese officials in the late-2010s.

China switched away from this blueprint around 2023. Instead, it positioned itself as more of a global peacemaker.

Global politics

Wang’s remarks did bear the hallmarks of “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy. But I think he also used his appearance at the conference to signal something greater in China’s diplomatic strategy – a desire to position itself as the beneficiary of the current turbulence in global politics.

The term “Wolf Warrior” stems from a 2015 Chinese war film of the same name. The movie follows a special forces soldier of the People’s Liberation Army, the military wing of the Chinese Communist Party or CCP, who fights and defeats a group of foreign mercenaries.

It was followed by a second film in 2017. The success of the franchise inspired so-called “Wolf Warriors” among China’s nationalist movement. These people called for senior officials to be more assertive in their foreign policy, threatening coercive action where they need to.

The relationship between the CCP and China’s nationalists is complex. Yet, the reliance of the Party on the movement for support gave it – and, by extension, the “Wolf Warriors” – significant influence to pressure officials into pursuing a more assertive foreign policy.

‘Wolf Warriors’ changed the face of China’s diplomacy. Art: China Factor

This led to the development of “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy. Similar to the unapologetic use of force employed by the film’s titular character to battle foreign enemies, Chinese diplomats used threats to silence foreign criticism of the country and its government.

The idea was to portray strength to domestic and international audiences. One example of “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy occurred in 2020.

In response to the award of a Swedish literature prize to Gui Minhai, a human rights activist who is imprisoned in China on unsubstantiated “spying” charges, Beijing’s ambassador to Sweden Gui Congyou publicly stated on Swedish radio:

We treat our friends with fine wine, but for our enemies we’ve got shotguns.

Violent expansion

Wang made a similar threat against Japan in Munich. When asked a about the rising tensions between Beijing and Tokyo, he made reference to Japan’s history of violent expansion and then threatened:

If you [Japan] go back down the old road, it will be a dead end. If you try gambling again, the loss will be faster and more devastating.

Wang was a proponent of “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy at its height, and for him to be making threats at an international conference is reminiscent of China’s worryingly assertive foreign policy posture of the recent past.

But his broader rhetoric in Munich reflected a level-headed diplomatic strategy. In his keynote speech, he spoke of the need for the UN and for global cooperation and collaboration. He also called for greater European representation in the peace talks between Russia and Ukraine.

And he framed recent US foreign policy as undermining international law, highlighting American interference in Venezuela as a key example.

Pledging allegiance to China’s Communist Party. Image: YouTube / Social Media

Wang appears to have been trying to use an international event to position China as an alternative global leader to the United States that is interested in upholding Western institutions of global governance and law.

In contrast to knee-jerk nationalism and jingoism as a hallmark of foreign policy, this speaks to a strategy that seeks to manoeuvre Beijing into a position where it can court favour with the countries Washington is antagonising.

This approach predates Wang’s speech and seems to be working. Even the United Kingdom, considered the closest US ally in Europe, has been forging new agreements with China in recent weeks. These include visa-free travel, intelligence-sharing and possible trade deals.

So, why then did Wang attack Japan in Munich? Tensions between the two nations are particularly tense at the moment. And, while it is hostile to foreign interference generally, China’s nationalist movement is specifically anti-Japanese.

Nationalist movement

It draws heavily from the narrative of the “century of humiliation,” a period from 1839 to 1949 in which China was victimised by foreign powers. A prominent example of this was the second Sino-Japanese war (1937-45), which resulted in the deaths of up to 20 million Chinese people.

There remains considerable animosity over this conflict. Given his “Wolf Warrior” background, and the tensions between China and Japan, Wang’s rhetoric was unsurprising.

I suspect it reflects a combination of his personal views, pressure from China’s nationalist movement and compliance with the CCP’s official line on discussing the tensions with Japan.

Yet, this should not distract from the broader view Wang gave of Chinese diplomacy and how Beijing is positioning itself to benefit from the turbulent state of global politics.

Lewis Eves is a Lecturer in the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Nottingham.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of China Factor.