Trump is abandoning US partners in the Indo-Pacific

Over the past 15 years, United States strategic policy had gradually shifted toward a primary focus on Asia or the Indo-Pacific. After the George W Bush presidency, which was centered on the war in Iraq, the Obama administration launched what it called a “pivot” to Asia in 2011.

The aim was to develop stronger military, diplomatic, and economic ties with the region. Overall, the pivot was supposed to make clear that Asia was at the center of US economic and strategic interests, and Washington needed to recognize this shift. 

As part of the pivot, the Obama White House deepened engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN. It also, in its National Security Strategy, promised to move a higher percentage of American military assets to the region. 

The administration also upgraded alliances with South Korea, Japan, and Australia, and created a much closer partnership with Vietnam, despite ongoing major concerns about Hanoi’s human rights record. 

The US even planned to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership or TPP, a massive, region-wide trade deal. The White House also expanded defense exercises with many regional partners. Yet the promises of the pivot did not always come to fruition.

Export controls

Ultimately, the US did not join the TPP, which became unpopular with the public and portions of both political parties. Some Southeast Asian states even complained that the Obama administration, like its predecessor, failed to send high-ranking officials to summits.

Still, the shift to a focus on the Indo-Pacific seemed to have become ingrained in American policy. In the first Trump term, policymakers revived the largely dormant Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, a gathering of leaders from Australia, India, Japan, and the United States. 

Along with its partners, the US turned the Quad, which had basically been abandoned, into a productive forum for regional strategic dialogue. In its National Security Strategy, the first Trump White House also clearly viewed China as a competitor. 

It said that Beijing was attempting to “displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific and reorder the region in its favor.” Responding to the challenge, Trump imposed export controls on a wide range of high-tech items destined for China, while working with partners.

The administration also deepened ties to India, with Trump hosting Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at a raucous gathering in Texas.

When Joe Biden took office, his administration maintained – and even hardened – some of Trump’s policies toward China, while deepening ties to Pacific partners in other ways. Indeed, he toughened export controls, and also built close defense links with the Philippines.

A key American ally, the alliance would be essential in the case of war in Southeast Asian waters. Biden also publicly announced that the US would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion, a major statement.

Yet, the second Trump administration seems ready to abandon what had been a bipartisan approach to the Indo-Pacific now dating back at least 15 years – and one that President Trump had embraced in his first term.

The most recent National Security Strategy or NSS, released last year, makes clear that the White House’s top priority is maintaining US dominance of the Western Hemisphere, and spends relatively little time talking about the strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific. 

China does not appear in the NSS until the 19th page of the 29-page document, as CFR’s David Sacks has noted. Meanwhile, the White House has spent a considerable amount of its time feuding with European defense partners and questioning alliances with Europe.

Major player

This has left even less time to focus on Asia. The administration has further cast doubt on the reliability of its defense relationships with some of its closest partners in Asia, such as Japan. 

Further, despite close ties in his first administration, Trump’s return has seen a rapid downgrade of links with India, a major regional player and one that multiple administrations had cultivated. 

His decision to impose 50% tariffs on India and his outreach to Pakistan – an economy nowhere near the size of its bigger neighbor – has shattered the US-India relationship. 

In addition, the administration had already alienated some Asian partners through its repeated tariff negotiations, some of which fluctuated wildly. Manny allies also raised concerns that the White House could come back with demands for higher tariffs. 

The unpredictability has impacted supply chains and could be a drag on growth in Asia this year. As for Taiwan, the biggest flashpoint in the region, the Trump White House seems less sure than it was in its first term. 

Colleague David Sacks has pointed out the language notes in the new NSS, that the US will no longer “oppose” any “unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait,” but will simply “not support” it, a move that stands to heighten uncertainty in Taipei. 

The NSS also focuses less on China as a strategic competitor and more on economic ties. The White House recently agreed to sell advanced chips to China, a turnaround from Trump’s first administration and a move opposed by many US partners.

Further, the new National Defense Strategy or NDS also focuses on the Western Hemisphere and on defending the United States homeland. It does discuss deterring Beijing, but downgrades China as a threat to American interests, contrary to prior US strategy. 

The NDS does not even mention Taiwan, a shift from prior versions, or the Quad, even though that had been a Trump success story. As Wen Ti Sung, of the Atlantic Council, noted: 

The NDS mentions five areas where the United States will prioritize the provision of ‘critical but limited support from US forces,’ and the Taiwan Strait is not one of them.

American reliability

Asian states are already responding. Some, like Japan and South Korea, are becoming clearer about needing to provide more for their own defense. Others, like India, are moving toward other major powers, including Russia and others. 

But all of them are reconsidering the reliability of American partnerships.

Joshua Kurlantzick is a Senior Fellow for Southeast Asia and South Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations.

This edited article was published by the Council on Foreign Relations under a Creative Commons license. Read the original here.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of China Factor.