China and the United States battle for supremacy

Last year competition between China and the United Stars for strategic dominance in the Indo-Pacific reached new heights. The two great powers confronted each other over tariffs, critical minerals, the clean energy transition and the race for AI. 

While scholars have emphasized the material – especially military – dimension of this battle, perceptions of legitimacy are also a key driver behind regional order building. 

Washington and Beijing have struggled to maintain legitimacy, leading Indo-Pacific nations to question the need for an American or Chinese regional hegemony.

Far from being bystanders, the Indo-Pacific’s middle and small powers play an active role in navigating great powers by helping to shape the regional order. When the legitimacy of the US and China is in question, they push back their strategies.

From the vantage point of material power, a hegemon can force weaker nations into submission. But an effective and enduring hegemon is one that is legitimate and accepted, not feared, by other countries. 

Regional affairs

Antonio Gramsci visualized hegemony as “the combination of force and consent variously balancing one another, without force exceeding consent too much.” Without legitimacy and acceptance by the middle and small states, the order would be contested or resisted.

There are two types of legitimacy – performance-based and procedural. The former refers to the hegemon’s provision of benefits to regional countries. The latter denotes the hegemon’s regular participation in regional affairs. 

In the Indo-Pacific, Washington had historically served as the hegemon by ensuring stability and promoting economic growth while regularly attending regional meetings. 

Beijing has also provided tangible benefits via the Belt and Road Initiative, while the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, or RCEP, has reflected “the economic realities of the region centred on China.”

But in dealing with its allies, the US government under President Donald Trump has been transactional and coercive. This hardline approach resulted in concessions from some countries while diminishing Asian nations’ trust in Washington in the long run.

Trump’s transactional approach has pushed some nations into China’s orbit. Kenyan President William Ruto, during his visit to Beijing last year, said both nations would be the “co-architects of a new world order.” 

Still, there have also been concerns about China’s crackdowns in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, as well as its aggressive behaviour in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. 

According to a survey, elites from six nations in Southeast Asia did not think Beijing had “the authority to lead the region,” preferring ASEAN instead. 

Against this backdrop, Southeast Asian countries have emphasised ASEAN’s role by announcing their own Indo-Pacific strategy, the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. It is also enshrined within RCEP.

Burden sharing

Having suffered from lengthy colonial rule, many Indo-Pacific nations seek autonomy as a key foreign policy priority. ASEAN’s hesitance to join a countervailing coalition against Beijing is shaped in part by “a quest for autonomy within a dynamic regional equilibrium.” 

Concerns about ripple effects of rivalry between Washington and Beijing and the exclusive nature of the US-led Quad and the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organisation also make middle and small states reluctant to join an American or Chinese-led regional order. 

Responses from the US and China have not reassured regional countries. The Trump administration’s November National Security Strategy pushes its allies for greater defence spending and burden sharing. 

In turn that has “stoked fears about Washington’s commitment” to their alliances in the Indo-Pacific. On the economic front, Singapore’s Prime Minister Lawrence Wong warned that Trump’s aggressive tariffs would “accelerate the fracturing of the global economy.” 

The Xi government initially benefited from the perceived legitimacy crisis of Trump 2.0, as Beijing expanded its trade with Asian neighbours and attended various regional meetings such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Leaders’ Summit which Trump skipped. 

But the furious reactions of Xi Jinping’s government to Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s remarks in November about a Taiwan contingency raised concerns for Japan and other nations amid Beijing’s “growing assertivenes and economic coercion.”

Instead of following the two great powers’ initiatives, middle and small nations in the Indo-Pacific constantly monitor US and Chinese rhetoric and behavior. 

Based on their varied assessments of legitimacy, several countries, such as Japan, Australia and the Philippines, have leant towards the US-led regional order. 

Legitimacy battle

Other nations, such as South Korea, Singapore, Vietnam and Cambodia, straddle between Washington and Beijing, seeking a narrower focus on East Asia.

The result is an evolving and contested regional order in the Indo-Pacific. How the US-China rivalry will play out in the second year of the Trump presidency is not entirely clear. But the battle for legitimacy will shape the rivalry and regional order in the Indo-Pacific.

Il Hyun Cho is a Professor in the Department of Government and Law and the Asian Studies Program at the Lafayette College in the United States and the Associate Editor of H-Diplo/Robert Jervis International Security Studies Forum.

A version of this article was first published here in Pacific Affairs.

This edited article is republished from East Asia Forum under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article here.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of China Factor.