Beijing walks a fine line in dealing with the Taliban 

China’s engagement with the Taliban jolted a dormant debate on whether Beijing will move to recognize Afghanistan’s rulers. The question resurfaced during Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Kabul in August.

He turned up for the sixth China-Pakistan-Afghanistan Foreign Ministers’ Trilateral Dialogue – the clearest sign of Beijing’s close engagement.

Since the Taliban’s 2021 takeover, China has kept its embassy open, expanded cooperation and accepted its ambassador. Beijing has not crossed the threshold of de jure recognition, but it has consolidated a durable de facto partnership.

That stance reflects two calculations. First, China treats Afghanistan as a continuous sovereign state – whatever government sits in Kabul. Engagement preserves continuity. 

Second, the absence of international consensus allows Beijing to press counterterrorism priorities, especially against the United Nations-sanctioned East Turkestan Islamic Movement or ETIM.

Diplomatic relations

At the same time, it acts as a testing ground, which could eventually see the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor extended into Afghanistan. 

Beijing has never stopped recognizing Kabul. This year’s 70th anniversary of Sino-Afghan diplomatic relations was a centerpiece of Foreign Minister Wang’s remarks. 

But China has avoided a formal declaration that the Taliban is the lawful government in the country. It has instead normalized dealings with the authorities who control the territory – de facto recognition without the legal symbolism of de jure endorsement. 

Two developments embody these judgments. First, in 2024 China accepted the credentials of the Taliban’s ambassador in Beijing, signaling that while it stopped short of endorsing the regime’s legality, it accepted its representatives. 

Second, Wang’s trip was his second visit since 2022. In July, the geopolitical context took another turn when Russia moved to formal recognition. Moscow’s step sharpened the contrast.

One great power jumped to de jure endorsement while another took a more circumspect approach. Without international consensus, Beijing will likely stay in the middle lane. They will recognize the state, but leave formal ratification open.

For China, its neighbor is first a counterterrorism problem and only second an economic opportunity. Wang linked security and development, singled out the ETIM and framed engagement as an exchange for deeper ties.

In return, Kabul must show credible suppression of cross-border militant activity and firm commitments not to allow any forces to threaten China. Those stipulations underpin de facto recognition of the regime.

The Taliban must also deliver on the ground to unlock more cooperation. Nor is the ETIM the only concern. Groups such as Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and Islamic State Khorasan Province pose risks.

Small projects

They directly impact China-Pakistan coordination, as those networks operate across the Afghanistan-Pakistan borderlands, raising spillover threats for Chinese personnel.

Afghanistan sits at the hinge of Central and South Asia. Even modest improvements in road security could make north-south and east-west corridors more plausible. 

Still, Beijing appears poised to see whether parts of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor can be extended into Afghanistan, such as power, logistics and mining. For Kabul’s war-hit economy, even small projects would be a significant step forward. 

Such gestures might invite international criticism that this is recognition by stealth. But such a move is a workhorse of international practice. Countries have long separated “doing business” from “conferring legitimacy.” 

Accepting representatives, reopening dialogues and signing technical accords can signal de facto recognition without crossing the legal Rubicon of de jure endorsement. This is precisely what China is using with the Taliban.

The benefit of this approach is flexibility. If the Kabul regime meets counterterrorism benchmarks and provide credible protection for Chinese personnel and assets, Beijing can ratchet up investment, broaden training and institutionalize commerce. 

If they backslide, China can slow or suspend cooperation without the reputational cost of walking back a formal recognition agreement.

But engagement cannot be blind to human rights abuses, the exclusion of women from public life or the risks of legitimizing one faction, while rivals claim a legal mandate in exile. Investors will also not ignore kidnappings, bombings, or rifts inside the Taliban. 

And there is a moral hazard. If governments can secure trade and aid without political reform, incentives for inclusion diminish. These are serious objections, and they must shape the guardrails of China’s engagement, not end it.

Security incentives

The answer is a transparent, conditions-based de facto recognition – and tie any expansion of economic cooperation to measurable progress. 

It should use the trilateral channel to align Pakistan’s security incentives with Kabul’s obligations and to de-risk corridor projects in phases. Above all, it should keep the legal question open. 

Recognize Afghanistan’s sovereignty, deal with the authorities in place and let formal recognition await a broader international settlement.

Hao Nan is a Nuclear Futures Fellow with the Ploughshares Fund & Horizon 2045. He previously served at East Asian intergovernmental organizations such as the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat in Seoul, and the ASEAN-China Centre in Beijing.

This edited article is republished from East Asia Forum under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article here.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of China Factor.