Japan juggles its China policy after election defeat 

In Japan’s July Upper House elections, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party or LDP and its coalition partner Komeito suffered a major defeat. Conservative parties such as Sanseito and the Conservative Party of Japan made significant gains. 

During the election campaign, xenophobic rhetoric was prevalent, and there was widespread criticism that Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba was “pandering to China.” 

Even though right-wing minor parties made significant gains, the LDP-led government remains in power, as only half of the 250 seats in the House of Councillors were up for election.

Still, the LDP lost a significant number, and the ruling coalition failed to secure a majority. It also failed to secure a majority in the House of Representatives, making it a minority government in both houses. But the Ishiba administration continues. 

The basic framework of his China policy is a continuation of predecessor Fumio Kishida’s strategy. 

Hawkish faction

During a meeting in Peru last year, Ishiba and Chinese president Xi Jinping confirmed the comprehensive promotion of a “strategic mutually beneficial relationship.” It was centered on cooperation regarding the common interests of both countries.

But since the Kishida government, the international environment has undergone significant changes.

Donald Trump’s re-election in the United States is one factor. Another is that China has more enthusiasm for the Ishiba administration, which does not include any ministers affiliated with the LDP faction of the hawkish former prime minister Shinzo Abe. 

Ishiba, for example, opposes visits to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, and he regards former prime minister Kakuei Tanaka, who achieved the normalization of Japan-China diplomatic relations, as his “mentor.” 

Both these issues have been seen in a positive light by Beijing. China has sent a number of friendly messages to Ishiba and shown a willingness to respond to Japan’s requests regarding the issue of treated wastewater from the Fukushima nuclear power plant.

The United States is also taking a tough stance on tariffs, even toward its allies. Though the importance of Japan-US security ties was confirmed between Ishiba and Trump, Tokyo is concerned that Washington’s interest in security relations with its allies is declining. 

For China, such a situation is favorable. Beijing will take this opportunity to try to divide the unity between the United Staters and its allies, as well as among the allies themselves.

Since Ishiba took office, visits to China by LDP executives and Diet members have become more frequent. 

Economic relations

LDP Secretary-General Yutaka Moriyama has been particularly active, giving conservatives the impression that the Ishiba administration is “pro-China.” 

But some view such exchanges between lawmakers as important for maintaining channels of communication between Japan and China amid poor US-China relations under the Trump White House.

Beijing is still Tokyo’s largest trading partner, and economic relations remain important. Ishiba himself has refrained from discussing issues, such as the establishment of an Asian version of NATO and the revision of the US-Japan Status of Forces Agreement.

Before taking office, he had advocated for change, but is now seeking to maintain the security alliance between Tokyo and Washington. The Ishiba administration could be trying to strike a balance between the United States and China.

There are certainly grounds for criticisms of Ishiba’s Beijing policy. The Chinese People’s Liberation Navy and the Coast Guard have become more active in waters around Japan than ever before. 

The fact that two Chinese aircraft carriers have reached the Second Island Chain and are conducting activities there is putting pressure on Japan’s security community.

There have also been incidents of Japanese nationals being attacked and  businesspeople being detained in China. 

Last year, the anniversary of the Japanese Empire’s 1931 invasion of Manchuria, a Japanese child was killed during a series of attacks near Japanese schools in China.

Japanese society

The large number of Chinese tourists visiting Japan, as well as ongoing disputes between Chinese migrants and Japanese residents in the country, have likely stoked negative sentiments among a section of Japanese society.

After the 2010s, 90% of Japanese citizens have held negative feelings toward China, which politicians have kept in mind. But 60% believe that relations with Beijing are important. 

The Japanese government must manage its relations with China while being mindful of these nuanced public sentiments.

Yet the economy, which has long underpinned the importance of strong relations, is losing its salience. The number of Japanese citizens who support maintaining strong ties with China is gradually declining.

Traditionally, Tokyo has managed its relations with Beijing through the principle of separation of politics and economics. But maintaining this policy has become increasingly difficult as economic security issues have gained prominence. 

While Japanese companies still place a high value on the Chinese market and are working to minimize the impact of economic security concerns, direct investment is declining, and various forms of risk are becoming more strongly recognized.

The Ishiba administration places greater emphasis on dialogue with China than previous administrations, which were organized by the Abe faction, a conservative political group within the LDP. 

There are no former Abe faction ministers in the government, making the situation difficult to navigate.

Greater autonomy

If the next administration is led by the conservative wing of the LDP, Japan’s policy toward China could shift to a more hardline stance, including on issues of historical recognition, which would threaten the relatively stable bilateral relationship. 

But even if conservative powers rise in Japan, this does not necessarily mean that they will immediately move toward strengthening the Tokyo-Washington alliance. 

The Sanseito, which made significant gains in the election, has taken a critical stance and is instead advocating for greater autonomy in Japan’s security policy.

Shin Kawashima is a Professor in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences at the University of Tokyo.

This edited article is republished from East Asia Forum under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article here.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of China Factor.