Asia needs a NATO-style alliance to combat China
A swift collective response is crucial in dealing with crises such as the South China Sea disputes
Asia faces rising security challenges from China’s assertiveness, North Korea’s nuclear program and regional coercion, prompting debate over a NATO-style alliance.
There have been endeavors in the past to establish such a structure, with little success. In 1954, the United States oversaw the establishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, or SEATO, to curb the spread of communism in the region.
Yet it had more of a symbolic function. SEATO only had three Asian participants – Thailand, Pakistan and the Philippines – and was dominated by Western powers like the United States, United Kingdom, France, Australia and New Zealand.
India, Indonesia and Vietnam opted not to join the pact. Since SEATO lacked an integrated command center or automatic defense obligation like NATO’s Article 5 and failed to halt the communist advance in Indochina, it was disbanded in 1977.
Yet while SEATO may be viewed as a product of the Cold War, it offers strategic takeaways relevant for Asia’s current security context. Unlike the 1950s, today’s Asia contains a network of bilateral treaties and mini-lateral initiatives.
Regional emergencies
The US-Japan and US-South Korea alliances remain firm, and Australia and the Philippines are strengthening their military engagement with Washington. New frameworks like AUKUS and the Quad are unlocking additional avenues.
But these structures are disjointed at best. Asia lacks a codified, NATO-style collective defense arrangement.
While US-Japan-South Korea trilateral security collaboration is progressing, it is not a “collective alliance” capable of undertaking joint action during regional emergencies.
Still, interest in a formalized security coalition is intensifying, with Tokyo, Seoul and Canberra attempting to align strategic policies to address shared threats. But forming a coherent alliance in Asia is significantly more complicated than in Europe.
Enduring historical animosity between Japan and South Korea can resurface when new leadership transitions occur in either country. Inconsistent threat assessments across leading Asian states pose another barrier.
For example, India is hesitant to codify defense commitments within a binding treaty. Many Southeast Asian nations also continue to adopt a hedging strategy between the United States and China.
Asia’s diplomatic tradition – especially the “ASEAN way” – emphasizes consensus, non-interference and informality. While this approach might have contributed to preventing the outbreak of an all-out war, it has limitations.
Maritime coercion
This includes dealing with crises such as the South China Sea disputes and fails to ensure a swift collective response or institutionalized deterrence.
Unlike Europe and the Middle East, where a collective security mindset has been shaped through conventional warfare, many Asian nations are still inclined towards diplomatic hedging.
But this culture of strategic ambiguity does not meet the urgency of today’s gray-zone threats, including cyberattacks and maritime coercion. A new security structure should confront this institutional inertia and gradually seek to overcome it.
The most critical distinction between Asia and NATO lies in the geographic landscape. In Europe, collective defense was imperative due to proximity and historical partnerships, while Asia faces heightened complexity due to its vast territorial span and political diversity.
NATO was also founded under the unified perception of a Soviet threat, whereas Asia lacks such consensus. Another pressing issue is China’s economic leverage.
Regional governments seeking to bolster security links with Washington must weigh the risk of reduced market access or punitive trade measures from Beijing, as faced by Australia and South Korea.
Any future proposal for a security alliance in Asia must carefully account for these challenges by actively pursuing a policy to diversify trade.
Yet, the strategic landscape of the 2020s presents a more favorable environment for Asian states than in the 1950s. Shared exposure to economic coercion, cyber intrusions and gray-zone maritime tactics is drawing regional democracies closer.
Intelligence cooperation
More countries are acknowledging that bilateral partnerships alone are insufficient to manage complex, cross-border threats. Coordinated planning, intelligence cooperation and compatible defense systems are now essential.
Asia should not replicate NATO’s blueprint or aspirations. Rather, regional actors should prioritize measures aimed at enhancing joint operational effectiveness.
Pragmatic initial steps include conducting regular multinational drills, creating unified crisis-response procedures and forming a permanent US-Japan-South Korea maritime security dialogue.
These efforts could form the basis for a future formalized alliance. But realizing any regional security arrangement depends heavily on the credibility and consistency of leadership in the United States.
The Trump administration’s ambiguous and inconsistent signaling towards NATO has increased doubts about Washington’s long-term security commitments.
This means that future discussions on Asia’s defense planning must involve both US support and strong regional ownership, who ever is in the White House.
SEATO’s failure should not deter Asia from building a new model. Over-dependence on external powers, insufficient regional ownership and poorly designed institutions of the past are merely pitfalls to avoid.
Security framework
While today’s conditions are different, current volatility demand even greater urgency. Asia does not require a NATO clone, but it urgently needs a more resilient and coherent security framework than the patchwork arrangements that exist today.
Ju Hyung Kim is President of the Security Management Institute, a defense think tank affiliated with the South Korean National Assembly.
This edited article is republished from East Asia Forum under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article here.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of China Factor.