Taiwan’s perilous path amid China-US tension

Taiwan has often compared itself to being a “shrimp between two whales.” That expression has never been more apt than today with the United States and China – which considers Taiwan to be part of its territory – locked in a standoff over the future of the island.

At an event I attended some years ago, a Chinese scholar remarked when the issue of the US-China rivalry came up that they believed there was an African saying:

When two elephants are either having a fight, or making love, the grass around them gets trampled.

It was best for everyone, they advised the other attendees, for the two superpowers to have a workmanlike relationship rather than take the risk of things getting too friendly or hostile.

But whether or not the current period of conflict continues or Washington and Beijing magically become more aligned, the challenges facing Taiwan are severe.

First off, the island democracy is in a period of domestic turbulence. The government of Taiwanese president William Lai Ching-te, leader of the Democratic Progressive Party, was elected last year with a little over 40% of the vote.

Corruption charges

This was considerably less than his predecessor from the same party, Tsai Ing-wen.

One of the main opposition leaders, Ke Wen-je of the Taiwan People’s Party, has since then been arrested on corruption charges.

He is accused of accepting half a million US dollars in bribes during his term as mayor of Taipei as well as misreporting campaign finances during his presidential run.

Last month, recall votes were held where citizens in 24 districts of Taiwan chose whether or not to remove their legislator from office.

This is the result of a law in Taiwan stipulating a new vote if 10% of the electorate in a specific constituency express dissatisfaction at the previous outcome. Activists supporting the government mobilised to achieve this.

The votes seem to be associated with frustration that, while the Democratic Progressive Party controls the presidency, it cannot get legislation through a parliament dominated by its rivals.

All of the votes were directed at seats held by the Kuomintang, the main opposition party in recent years that is accused by its critics of being pro-China. Not a single seat was overturned.

When the steady nationalism of Xi Jinping’s leadership in Beijing is factored in, with its conviction that the global influence of the West is slowly declining and the East – dominated by China – is in the nascent, one can see why the issue of Taiwan might look more precarious.

This is regardless of the various predictions that 2027 is the date that China has set to go for reunification. For the US, President Donald Trump’s fixation has remained on correcting what he sees as China’s unfair trade advantages with its largest single economic partner.

New deal

He has long talked about this. In March, the White House proclaimed, when the first set of trade negotiations with China concluded after tariffs were imposed by both sides, that:

For too long, unfair trade practices and America’s massive trade deficit with China have fuelled the offshoring of American jobs and the decline of our manufacturing sector.

Last month’s talks in Stockholm were aimed at driving a new deal. Trump has also reportedly talked of taking a huge delegation of business people to China later this year. This is despite the fact that since his inauguration in January, Xi and Trump have yet to physically meet.

Taiwanese people are therefore right to feel increasingly uneasy. Under Trump’s predecessor, Joe Biden, they received verbal commitments that the US would come to island’s aid if it was attacked. This was not formal US policy, which has long maintained an ambiguous stance.

Ambiguity has returned with a vengeance under Trump. His secretary of defence, Pete Hegseth, has said that the US stands by Taiwan. But these days in Washington all roads lead to the Oval Office, and Trump’s stance is far harder to predict.

If China were to dangle a trade deal in front of the US president – committing to buy more American goods, put in more investment that is non-problematic on security grounds in the US and generally abide by Washington’s demands – would Trump be able to resist?

It could be presented as a historic achievement, a new concordant between the world’s two greatest powers who had seemed until then set on conflict and clash. There might even be the much desired Nobel Peace Prize in it for the US leader.

Trump, for his part, appears increasingly reluctant to back Taiwan in ways that risk provoking Beijing. Lai delayed a trip to Latin America in July after the Trump administration reportedly told him to cancel a proposed stopover in New York.

Unpredictable times

And the US cancelled a meeting with Taiwan’s defence minister one month earlier.

The likelihood remains that, if a real crisis occurs, then Washington will climb down from the middle wall and do something to defend Taiwan. Any trade deal between China and the US will also probably be a highly circumscribed one.

Beijing is not an easy partner to negotiate with, and it is unlikely to offer Trump the kind of capitulation he is seeking. Even so, these are very unpredictable times.

The key calculation going forward will be the simple one of what the US gains and loses from all its relationships – and that includes Taiwan.

Kerry Brown is a Professor of Chinese Politics and the Director of the Lau China Institute at King’s College London.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of China Factor.