China’s jingoistic diplomacy tempts Southeast Asia

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s rare diplomatic tour of Vietnam, Malaysia and Cambodia in April represents a calculated attempt to leverage American trade tensions and pull Southeast Asia closer to Beijing’s orbit. 

The timing was strategic as it occurred amid strained relations between the United States and China over President Donald Trump’s tariffs.

Southeast Asian economies rely heavily on exports to the US, but as a bloc, ASEAN is also China’s largest trading partner after it overtook the European Union in 2020. Countries in this region do not want to be caught in the crossfire between the two superpowers.

Xi’s destinations reflect China’s strategic calculations. Vietnam and Cambodia faced some of the highest initial US tariff rates at 46% and 49% respectively, forcing both nations to scramble for negotiations with the Trump administration. 

Malaysia, facing 24% tariffs, is the 2025 ASEAN Chair and will play a leading role in setting the bloc’s agenda on pressing issues including South China Sea disputes.

Trade tensions

It is no easy task to persuade countries such as Vietnam to move away from “Bamboo Diplomacy,” a foreign policy approach characterized by engaging in strategic diversification and balancing relations between the two superpowers. 

But trade tensions have created a window of opportunity for China to present itself as a more reliable partner than the United States.

This softer approach during the tour marked a shift from Beijing’s assertive “Wolf Warrior diplomacy.” Instead, a strategy was adopted to mobilize nationalistic elements, stoking pride and a sense of urgency among its Southeast Asian neighbors. 

To some extent, it is reminiscent of the revolutionary rhetoric of the Mao era, though now in service of maintaining the multilateral trading system rather than promoting socialism.

Before arriving in Hanoi, Xi published an article in the official newspaper of Vietnam’s Communist Party Nhan Dan, calling for increased cooperation to “safeguard the multilateral trading system.” 

He highlighted the two countries’ shared “distinctive revolutionary traditions” and China’s historic “support for Vietnam’s just War Against US Aggression to Save the Nation.” 

This represented a departure from Xi’s previous articles published in Vietnamese state media in 2017 and 2023, which only made general references to “camaraderie plus brotherhood.”

Carefully choreographed

This evocation of the collective memory of anti-colonialism was complemented by diplomatic decorum on the ground. In a carefully choreographed ceremony, Xi laid a wreath at Ho Chi Minh’s mausoleum. 

Vietnam reciprocated this nationalist diplomacy. Communist Party Chief To Lam published a signed article in China’s People’s Daily calling citizens to make good use of “red” historical sites in both countries. 

In a joint statement following Xi’s visit, both countries pledged to implement a “red journey youth” research and study exchange program hosted by China.

But nationalism is a double-edged sword. While Beijing positioned itself as an alternative to perceived Washington aggression, it must also contend with anti-China sentiments, stemming partly from rising tensions in the South China Sea.

Survey data has revealed shifting regional perceptions. In 2024, China became the preferred alignment choice in Southeast Asia over the United States by 50.5% to 49.5%. 

This marked a change from 2023, when only 38.9% of respondents preferred Beijing to the Washington. But Vietnam consistently registered low favorability towards China – 22.1% in 2023 and 21% in 2024.

Beijing’s latest diplomatic push adopts a nuanced strategy of blending nationalist and regionalist discourses in ASEAN countries within a broader “Asian family.” Naturally, this includes China and implicitly excludes the United States.

In Malaysia, Xi vowed to use “Asian values of peace, cooperation, openness and inclusiveness” to counter “tariff abuse” and “the law of the jungle.”

‘Old friend’

In Cambodia, he likened his visit to “going to the home of an old friend,” calling for both countries to “stand against hegemonism” and work towards a “harmonious Asian home.” Such explicit anti-hegemonic narratives were rare, if not unseen, in Xi’s previous visits.

Southeast Asian leaders responded warmly to Xi’s approach. King Sihamoni of Cambodia welcomed Xi personally at the airport, marking the first time in his two-decade reign that he has greeted any foreign head of state in such manner. 

He also presented Xi with the National Order of Independence – Grand Collar at the Royal Palace in Phnom Penh.

Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim proved particularly receptive to Xi’s rhetoric. He lauded Xi as a great leader, before articulating his country’s stance amid tariff threats: 

We stand with the Chinese government, for the well-being of our people and for our national economic interests.

Beyond warm rhetoric, these visits produced tangible results. China signed cooperation agreements with all three countries, covering sectors from agricultural products and rail infrastructure to supply chains and artificial intelligence.

The underlying driver of Xi’s warm reception is regional fear over the potential collapse of the rules-based economic order. China has capitalized on this to bolster its legitimacy through tangible deals and emotive appeals. 

So far, Beijing has applied this strategy in a somewhat restrained manner, as both China and ASEAN still seek to resolve trade tensions with the US through dialogue.

Subtle shift

Balancing nationalist fervor with strategic flexibility both domestically and regionally will be crucial for Xi’s diplomacy amid intensifying competition with the US. 

Although Beijing’s nationalistic call for an “Asian family” is unlikely to resonate with all member states, we might be witnessing the subtle shift in China’s diplomatic approach.

Shenghua Zhang is a Research Associate at the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of London. 

This edited article is republished from East Asia Forum under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article here.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of China Factor.