Riding a wave of superpower strife in troubled waters

The South China Sea has long been a bubbling geopolitical hot spot. Yet a series of moves by the various nations claiming a stake in the waters has stirred up more trouble.

Malaysia has reaffirmed its commitment to oil and gas exploration in an area claimed by China while quietly building up its military on islands off Borneo.

At the same time, Chinese coast guard vessels have deployed water cannons against Filipino fishing boats. And the accidental grounding of a Chinese boat in shallow waters around the Philippines’ Thitu Island this month, was enough to put Filipino forces on alert.

Vietnam, too, has been active in the disputed waters. A Beijing-based think tank on June 7 flagged that Vietnamese engineers had been busy reclaiming land and installing military-related ports and airstrips around the Spratly Islands.

What the three Southeast Asian nations of Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia have in common is that they, along with others in the region, are trying to navigate a more assertive China. It comes at a time when American policy intentions are fluid and hard to read.

In lieu of a coordinated response from the regional body Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, each member has been charting its course in these choppy waters.

Military forces

So, why is Beijing trying to assert control in the South China Sea? In a 2023 speech, President Xi Jinping noted that “Western countries led by the United States have implemented all round containment, encirclement and suppression of China.”

This fear has been long held and was reinforced by a US Indo-Pacific policy announced in 2011 of rebalancing military forces away from Europe and toward Asia to confront China.

In response, Beijing has embarked on an ambitious strategy of attempting to outmuscle US naval power in the South China Sea. China is now the world’s leading builder of naval vessels and is projected to have 440 battleships by 2030, compared with America’s 300.

And it comes at a time when Washington’s naval power is spread across the world. Beijing’s fleet is concentrated around the South China Sea where, since 2013, its vessels have pumped sand onto reefs, turning them into islands and then weaponizing them.

Then there is the activity of Beijing’s maritime militia of approximately 300 nominally fishing boats equipped with water cannons and reinforced hulls for ramming. This so-called gray zone armada is increasingly active in confronting Southeast Asia nations at sea.

The US response to China’s militarization has been through so-called “freedom of navigation” exercises that often deploy carrier groups in a show of force. But these episodic displays are more performative than effective, doing little to deter China’s claims.

Washington has also strengthened military alliances with Australia, India, Japan and the Philippines, and has increased coast guard cooperation with the Philippines and Japan.

Yet the battle over control of the South China Sea is more than just geopolitical posturing between two superpowers.

Economic zone

For adjoining countries, the sea is a valuable biological resource with rich fishing grounds that provide a staple for close to two billion people. There are also estimates of 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 11 billion barrels of oil.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS, guarantees a nation an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 200 nautical miles from around its coastline. China is a signatory of the UNCLOS.

Yet it views ownership of the South China Sea through the lens of its nine-dash line, a reference to the boundary that Beijing has invoked since 1948.

While the claim has no legal or historical basis, it has not stopped China from making major incursions into waters around Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia and, to a lesser extent, Brunei and Indonesia as well.

Despite Beijing’s expansive claim to the South China Sea being dismissed in 2016 by the international Permanent Court of Arbitration, it continues to assert its claim.

As I explore in my recent book, Hedging and Conflict in the South China Sea, part of the problem Southeast Asian nations face is that they have failed to forge a unified position.

ASEAN, the regional bloc representing 10 nations in Southeast Asia, has long been governed by the principle that major decisions need unanimous agreement.

China is a major trading partner of ASEAN, so any regional country aligning too close to the US comes with the real risk of economic consequences.

And two ASEAN members, Cambodia and Laos, are especially close to Beijing, making it difficult to generate a unified ASEAN policy that confronts China’s maritime claim.

Instead, the bloc has promoted a regional code of conduct that effectively legitimizes China’s maritime policy, fails to mention the 2016 ruling and ignores the issue of conflicting claims.

Disputed islands

Further complicating a united front against Beijing is the competing claims among ASEAN nations to disputed islands in the South China Sea.

So, instead of a coordinated response, Southeast Asian nations have turned to hedging by maintaining good relationships with China and the United States.

Malaysia’s approach has been to partition off the South China Sea dispute from its overall bilateral ties with China while continuing to promote an ASEAN code of conduct.

Until recently, its oil and gas activities were well within Malaysia’s EEZ and not far enough out to fall into China’s nine-dash claim. But as these fields become exhausted, exploration will need to extend, putting Kuala Lumpur’s dealings with Beijing under pressure.

China’s nine-dash line also claims a significant amount of Vietnam’s EEZ, and the contested maritime area is a source of friction between the two countries. China’s maritime militia has regularly harassed Vietnamese fishermen and disrupted drilling operations in Vietnam’s EEZ.

But again, Vietnam has decided to tread carefully as China plays a significant role in the Vietnamese economy, including substantial foreign investment.

It also has the ability to dam the Mekong River upstream of Vietnam – something that would disrupt agricultural production. As a result, Vietnam’s hedging involves a careful calibration to avoid angering China.

The nine-dash claim also includes a wide swath of the Philippines’ EEZ, but Manila has zigzagged in dealing with China. The presidencies of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and Rodrigo Duterte pursued a pro-China tack, downplaying Filipino claims in the South China Sea.

Presidents Benigno Aquino and Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr, in contrast, have given American forces greater access to its maritime bases and mobilized national and international opinion in favor of its territorial rights.

Geopolitical fracture

Since coming to power, Marcos has also pursued even closer naval ties with Washington, but this has come at a cost. China now views the Philippines as a US ally. As such, Beijing sees little to be gained by pulling back from its assertive activity in and around these waters.

In the shadow of two major powers battling for power in the South China Sea, Southeast Asian nations are making the best of their position along a geopolitical fracture line. They are advancing their claims while not overly antagonizing China or losing the support of the US.

This may work to reduce tensions in the South China Sea. But it is a fluid approach not without risk, and it could yet prove to be another source of instability in a geopolitically contested and dangerous region.

John Rennie Short is Professor Emeritus of Public Policy at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County in the United States.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of China Factor.