Indonesia faces a delicate balancing act with China
‘Jakarta is reinforcing the defenses of its northernmost islands that are targeted by Beijing’
Foreign policy experts classify the United Kingdom and the United States as quintessential “offshore balancers.” But an often-overlooked major island country also enters this category – Indonesia. That is why the rise of a regional hegemon will be a wake-up call for Jakarta.
Offshore balancers often feel less urge to commit to continental power politics. They can enjoy the benefits of seclusion to focus on domestic development instead.
Since the sea palisades them against invasions, they require less formidable ground forces relative to continental powers. At the same time, large bodies of water make expansion on the continent more difficult.
There is one peril for which offshore balancers will firmly commit to continental security. A regional hegemon is the only type of rival strong enough to accumulate and project sufficient forces to subjugate or even conquer an offshore country.
Once relieved from rivals, a regional hegemon can focus on more faraway targets.
As the dominating behemoth, it can mobilise all the continent’s resources at its leisure for distant endeavors. As such, ensuring that no regional hegemon arises is imperative.
Power politics
If Indonesia is an offshore balancer, we should witness distinguishable patterns of behavior.
Typically, it would feel little need to participate in continental power politics, thanks to seclusion from the continent by bodies of water. Safe from invasions, the country should maintain a relatively small military relative to its potential.
But Jakarta would turn more assertive in the face of a could-be regional hegemon.
History suggests Indonesia behaves like an offshore balancer. When it gained independence in 1949, Southeast Asia faced no significant hegemonic threat.
China remained weak, and Vietnam was torn asunder by war. Jakarta could safely ignore continental conflicts and declare neutrality in the Cold War.
The regional balance shifted dramatically after Vietnam’s reunification in 1975 and its invasion of Cambodia in 1978. The growing Vietnamese threat pushed Jakarta to strengthen its military capabilities and improve combat readiness.
It assumed a leading position within ASEAN, helping transform it into a coalition to contain the expansion of communism in Southeast Asia. It also moved to mend its strained relations with China to counter-flank Hanoi’s formidable military capabilities.
But as expected from an offshore balancer, Indonesia ruled out direct military involvement.
Instead, it followed an indirect strategy similar to the United Kingdom’s when confronting hegemonic threats.
As of 2025, Indonesia has, on paper, a massive power potential. It is home to 280 million people, not very far behind the United States. The several-thousand-island archipelago has plenty of natural resources.
Its large population and growing economy should allow it to play a leading role in Southeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific.
Economic concessions
Yet, without a hegemonic threat, little in Indonesia’s behavior suggests a willingness to invest much in continental power politics. Its military spending is small compared to other leading powers, as it invests around 1% of its GDP in defense.
But this is likely to change since Jakarta now faces a potential regional hegemon.
China is well-positioned to reach that status over the Indo-Pacific and the Malay Archipelago. And it would be strong enough to force unpleasant territorial and economic concessions on Indonesia and turn the country into a mere satellite.
Signs that Jakarta is taking action to counterbalance Beijing’s rise are unmistakable.
The country’s defense spending is increasing. Under President Prabowo Subianto, it aims to spend one and a half per cent of its GDP on armed forces by 2029. There is now a strong willingness to overhaul the military in the face of the Chinese threat.
Jakarta is especially interested in reinforcing the defenses of its northernmost islands that are targeted by Beijing’s claims to rule the entire South China Sea.
A pivot towards the anti-hegemonic coalition accompanies this military awakening.
Indonesia has increasingly shed its Cold War-era neutralist skin to move decisively towards the United States and its partners. Jakarta is eager to train with US troops, purchase US weapons and improve links with US forces.
Washington contributed to building a maritime training center on Batam Island, which overlooks the Strait of Malacca. In 2023, American B-52 strategic bombers made their first visit to Indonesia, something inconceivable a decade earlier.
What comes next will depend on the regional balance of power.
If it remains stable, Indonesia will face less incentive to confront China head-on. It will probably be content to rely on continental states and Washington for regional security.
Defense investment
But if Beijing keeps rising, Jakarta will feel hard-pressed to play the power politics game. It may be forced to invest far more in defense and claim its mantle as a major power.
Indonesia would also need to dedicate more energy to Southeast Asian security, notably by forming a closer alignment with Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines.
Insularity offered security for decades, but this era is likely coming to an end.
Dylan Motin is a visiting scholar at Seoul National University’s Asia Center and a non-resident Kelly Fellow at Pacific Forum.
This edited article is republished from East Asia Forum under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article here.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of China Factor.