China’s threat cuts deep into global security networks

Chinese researchers have unveiled a new deep-sea tool capable of cutting through the world’s most secure subsea cables. And it has many in the West feeling a little jittery.

The development, first revealed in the Chinese-language journal Mechanical Engineering in February, was touted as a tool for civilian salvage and seabed mining.

But the ability to sever communications lines 13,000 feet or 4,000 meters below the sea’s surface is far beyond the operational range of most existing infrastructure. This means the tool can be used with far-reaching implications for global communications and security.

That is because undersea cables sustain the world’s international internet traffic, financial transactions and diplomatic exchanges.

Incidents of cable damage near Taiwan and in northern Europe have already raised concerns of these systems’ vulnerabilities and suspicions about the role of state-linked actors.

The growing sophistication of underwater technology evidenced by the latest news from China suggest that undersea infrastructure may play a key role in future strategic competition.

Direct war

Indeed, this development adds a new layer to the broader challenge of securing critical security systems amid expanding technological reach and the rise of so-called “gray zone” tactics – antagonisms that take place between direct war and peace.

Despite their unassuming appearance, undersea cables form the backbone of modern communications. Stretching around 870,000 miles or more than 1.4 million kilometers across every ocean, these cables transmit almost 100% of global internet communication.

Indeed, these information superhighways are a major engine for the modern economy and are indispensable for things such as almost instantaneous financial transactions and real-time diplomatic and military communications.

If all these cables were suddenly severed, only a sliver of United States communication traffic could be restored using every satellite in orbit.

The entire system is built, owned, operated and maintained by the private sector. Approximately 98% of these cables are installed by a handful of firms.

As of 2021, the American company SubCom, French firm Alcatel Submarine Networks and Japanese firm Nippon Electric Company collectively held an 87% market share. China’s HMN Tech holds another 11%.

Tech giants including Amazon, Google, Meta and Microsoft now own or lease roughly half of the undersea bandwidth worldwide, according to analysis by the US-based telecommunications research group TeleGeography.

The very characteristics that make undersea cables effective also render them highly vulnerable. Built to be lightweight and efficient, they are exposed to a variety of natural hazards, including underwater volcanic eruptions, typhoons and floods.

But human activity is still the primary cause of cable damage, whether from accidental anchor drags or inadvertent entanglement with trawler nets.

Civilian communications

Now, security experts are increasingly concerned that future human disruptions might be intentional, with nations launching coordinated attacks as part of a hybrid war strategy. Such assaults could disrupt not only civilian communications but also military networks.

An adversary, for example, could cut off a nation’s command structures from intelligence feeds, sensor data and communication with deployed forces.

The ramifications extend even to nuclear deterrence: Without reliable communication, a nuclear-armed state might lose the ability to control or monitor its strategic weapons.

The loss of communications, even for a few minutes, could be catastrophic. It could mean the difference between a successful defense and a crippling first strike.

In recent years, Western policymakers have become particularly concerned about the capabilities of Russia and China to exploit the vulnerabilities of undersea cables.

One such incident occurred in 2023 when Taiwanese authorities accused two Chinese vessels of cutting the only two subsea cables supplying internet to Taiwan’s Matsu Islands.

The resulting digital isolation of 14,000 residents for six weeks was not a one-off episode. Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party has pointed to a pattern, noting that Chinese vessels have disrupted cable operations on 27 occasions since 2018.

In January, Taiwan’s coast guard blamed a Cameroon- and Tanzania-flagged vessel crewed by seven Chinese nationals and operated by a Hong Kong-based company when an undersea cable was severed off the island’s northeastern coast.

Such incidents, often described as gray-zone aggression, are designed to wear down an adversary’s resilience and test the limits of response.

China’s recent push to enhance its cable-cutting capabilities coincides with a surge in its military drills around Taiwan, including a number of recent exercises.

NATO patrols

Similar cable disruptions have occurred in the Baltic Sea.

In 2023, a telecom cable connecting Sweden and Estonia was damaged along with a gas pipeline. In January, a cable linking Latvia and Sweden was breached, triggering NATO patrols and a Swedish seizure of a vessel suspected of sabotage tied to Russian activities.

Dmitry Medvedev, the deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council, even hinted at the possibility of targeting undersea communications as retaliation for actions such as the Nord Stream pipeline explosions in 2023.

The involvement of state-linked vessels operating under flags of convenience, or registered to another country, further complicates efforts to attribute and deter such attacks.

It isn’t just security and defense at risk. The modern financial system is predicated on the assumption of continuous, high-speed connectivity. Any interruption, however brief, could disrupt markets, halt trading and lead to significant monetary losses.

Given the strategic importance of undersea cables and the risks they face, Western governments intent on preventing further conflict would be wise to find an internationally coordinated way to secure the infrastructure against threats.

One clear option would be to bolster repair and maintenance capacities. Currently, a significant vulnerability stems from the overreliance on Chinese repair ships.

China’s robust maritime industry and state-supported investments in global telecommunications have contributed to the Asian nation taking a prominent position when it comes to cable repair vessels.

The protection of undersea cables should not, I believe, be viewed as the responsibility of any single nation but as a collective priority for all countries reliant on this infrastructure.

As such, international frameworks could facilitate information sharing, standardize security protocols and establish rapid response mechanisms in the event of a cable breach.

Vital infrastructure

But such global efforts would be fighting against the tide. The incidents in Taiwan, the Baltic Sea and elsewhere come as great power competition intensifies between the US and China.

Beijing, in developing deep-water cable-cutting technology, may be sending a message of intent. Meanwhile, the Trump administration’s “America First” approach signals a shift that could complicate efforts to foster partnerships.

The defense of undersea cables reflects the challenges of our hyperconnected world, requiring a balance of innovation, strategy and cooperation.

But as nations including China and Russia seemingly test and probe this vital global infrastructure, it appears the systems underpinning the West’s prosperity and security could become one of its greatest vulnerabilities.

John Calabrese is an assistant professor at the School of Public Affairs and a non-resident senior fellow of the Middle East Institute at the American University.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of China Factor.