Beijing revels in South Korea’s political crisis

Yoon Suk Yeol cemented his name in the history books on January 15, becoming the first sitting South Korean president to be arrested. In the month following the event, one of Asia’s most vibrant democracies and a key global economic player has been mired in chaos.

This political carnage came to a head with Yoon’s impeachment following his controversial declaration of martial law in December. Yoon’s arrest by the Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials sealed the fate of his political career.

His impeachment, indictment and ongoing criminal trial has left the nation in leadership limbo. 

South Korea’s political crisis stems from deep domestic fissures. Yoon’s martial law declaration – justified as a move against pro-North Korean anti-state forces – was widely perceived as a self-serving gambit.

A bid to retain power amid declining approval ratings and opposition dominance in the National Assembly. 

Acting president

While public opinion overwhelmingly supports Yoon’s removal, mistrust in the opposition Democratic Party also remains high, reflecting a broader disillusionment with major parties. 

The uncertainty has sparked mass protests, shaken public trust and destabilised South Korea’s political institutions. Acting president Han Duck-soo has also been impeached, leaving Finance Minister Choi Sang-mok as the interim leader.

But this turmoil is not just a domestic affair. 

South Korea’s ambitions to move beyond middle power status to a ’global pivotal actor’ while being a strategic US ally and an economic powerhouse means its internal challenges carry global significance. 

Its political paralysis comes at a time of heightened US-China competition, with Seoul caught in the middle.

Interestingly, South Korea’s political crisis has drawn ethnic Chinese into the narrative as a scapegoat, even as Beijing emerges as a beneficiary. The role of ethnic Chinese residents is becoming a strategic angle of discussion. 

The Hwagyo, or the ethnic Chinese community, is politicised in South Korea, with discriminatory policies and social bullying reported since the 1950s even as China continues to dominate immigration numbers coming into the country.

The crisis has seen a rise in anti-Chinese sentiments, with members of Yoon’s People Power Party accusing ethnic Chinese residents of supporting pro-impeachment rallies. 

Beijing was also made a central issue during the trial. 

Yoon’s attorneys raised concerns about alleged Chinese interference in South Korea via its “companies and people residing” there to “fund and support” pro-Beijing activities.

False story

Disinformation in South Korean media has fuelled Sinophobia.

A striking example was the circulation of a false story claiming that United States Forces Korea had arrested 99 Chinese spies linked to election rigging before transferring them to Okinawa. 

Although debunked, this narrative has gained traction among conservative commentators, reflecting the deeply polarised information ecosystem shaping public discourse.

A known follower of far-right YouTube channels, Yoon has been influenced by these conversations. On December 12, he framed his martial law declaration as a necessary response to growing security threats and foreign interference. 

Pointing to two incidents of Chinese nationals allegedly surveilling US-South Korean military sites in June and November, he further accused opponents of obstructing anti-espionage legislation.

Beijing swiftly condemned these claims. 

The Chinese embassy in Seoul issued a direct warning to Chinese expatriates, advising them to avoid political gatherings to prevent legal repercussions, including potential deportation. 

By issuing this warning and framing Seoul’s actions as discriminatory, Beijing is positioning itself as a defender of overseas Chinese communities, reinforcing its extraterritorial influence.

Allegations of Chinese espionage and involvement in pro-impeachment protests have fueled Sinophobia in South Korea, playing into Beijing’s hands by deepening domestic discord.

Chinese state media, such as Global Times and Xinhua, have amplified narratives of South Korean democratic dysfunction, contrasting it with China’s own model of political stability.

 Political leadership

This allows Beijing to deflect criticism of its Communist Party governance.

It also sows doubt about the efficacy of US-led alliances. Still, despite increasing Sinophobia, Beijing stands to gain from South Korea’s political crisis. 

Beyond a favourable change in political leadership, the turmoil has also provided China with opportunities in the maritime domain. 

The resumption of Chinese installations in the Yellow Sea amid Seoul’s leadership vacuum is not a coincidence but a calculated move to push for control over disputed waters. 

Beijing’s approach mirrors its South China Sea strategy by gradually altering facts on the ground through infrastructure development and military presence.

At the same time, it dismisses diplomatic protests as baseless.

With South Korea’s political institutions paralysed and its security apparatus preoccupied with internal instability, China faces minimal resistance, making this an opportune moment to expand its influence. 

The timing of these actions suggests that Beijing sees South Korea’s domestic unrest as a window to consolidate territorial claims that would otherwise face strong diplomatic and military pushback.

Beyond allowing for territorial manoeuvres, South Korea’s division continues to work in China’s favor should the Democratic Party come to power.

Viewed as a largely pro-China and anti-Japan party, a DP government would bode ill for South Korea-Japan relations and influence the stability of the US-South Korea alliance.

Testing alliances

Seoul’s political crisis underscores the fragility of democracies in a polarised world. 

For China, it is a chance to exploit divisions and project itself as a stabilising force. For South Korea, it is a reminder of the importance of resilience – in governance and regional strategy.

The crisis is a pivotal moment, testing alliances, exposing vulnerabilities and reshaping regional dynamics.

Eerishika Pankaj is the Director of the Organisation for Research on China and Asia (ORCA), a New Delhi-based think-tank. The views expressed by the author do not represent the views of their institutions.

This edited article is republished from East Asia Forum under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article here.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of China Factor.