Building BRICS for a China-led new world order
The group’s growth raises questions about whether the United States leadership will be challenged
BRICS has emerged as a significant international force since 2009 when it was established at a summit in Russia.
What began as a group of five encompassing Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, is now expanding with the integration of five new members and eight partner countries. Even more nations may join in the next few years.
This growth raises questions about whether BRICS will challenge the leadership of traditional powers such as the United States, the European Union and the United Kingdom.
Analysts are also questioning how united the bloc really is and whether a perceived lack of unity constitutes an obstacle to expansion.
BRICS is undoubtedly diverse. Iran and Saudi Arabia compete as regional powers in the Middle East, Egypt and Ethiopia have had different conflicts around the Nile’s governance, and the skirmishes between China and India are well known.
Diverse countries
Yet its strength may reside in a capacity to integrate a diverse array of countries that are not fully aligned. Building loose international organizations might be the key to navigating international politics in these times of increasing polarization.
The rise of BRICS must be put in the context of the ongoing rivalry between Washington and Beijing. Competition between the world’s two largest economies is likely to intensify in the coming years, shaping the contemporary global order.
China’s record US$1 trillion trade surplus last year and 5% economic growth have bolstered the narrative that its development model represents an alternative to the American-sponsored neoliberal policies that have dominated much of the world in the past four decades.

Political leaders and global economic elites are closely observing this competition with most countries striving to maintain an equidistant approach.
Nations traditionally within the US sphere of influence, including Brazil and Peru, have been cautiously moving towards China, attracted by the economic opportunities. Others previously in Beijing’s orbit, like Vietnam, are working to expand their ties with Washington.
China is unquestionably the driving force that holds BRICS together. Without Beijing, it would not have come into existence. The bloc also shares two key characteristics. Members are global south countries that do not belong to the traditional group of hegemonic powers.
And they have significant economic ties with China, especially through trade relations.
Global development
The official BRICS narrative emphasizes multilateralism, cooperation and fair global development. But in fact, the group serves primarily as an instrument for Beijing to project its power and influence.
China achieves this through a combination of rhetoric and by using the bloc as a special trade platform linked to the Belt and Road Initiative or BRI.
BRICS seeks to position itself as an alternative to US hegemony, promoting free trade and multilateralism. In times of political turbulence and the growth of illiberal forces, this narrative serves as a powerful legitimizing tool for the group globally.
But the bloc’s diversity also poses significant challenges to its rise as an alternative to the American-led global order. It is unlikely that BRICS will evolve into a unified military alliance like NATO or free trade areas such as ASEAN or USMCA, formerly NAFTA.

The group’s diversity prevents it from acquiring these characteristics.
Aware of this, China strategically uses the bloc to increase its business opportunities and international influence. It maintains a fine balance between a loose club and a more solidified military or economic alliance.
Contrary to the Cold War era, when the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, had well-defined spheres of influence, the current world order appears to be shaped by loose, interconnected international blocs.
China’s prominence within BRICS is clear and unlikely to change. It accounts for two-thirds of GDP and trade. The country is the primary partner for Brazil, Russia, India, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Key partner
It also holds significant investments in these nations. Russia is the largest recipient of Chinese foreign direct investment within BRICS worth more than $10 billion.
Most bloc states are also directly or indirectly involved in the BRI, such as Egypt, Ethiopia, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. Though not an official Belt and Road member, Brazil has become a key partner due to its role as a central food supplier to China.
These figures highlight that expanding BRICS is one of Beijing’s foreign policy priorities. The country uses the group to project both economic and ideological influence.
US President Donald Trump’s plans to impose trade tariffs on several countries, including China, is likely to prompt Beijing to intensify this policy.

It is a distinct possibility that the recent episode with Colombia, where Trump reportedly threatened to impose tariffs if Bogotá continued to push back against deportation flights, could encourage more countries to seek closer trading relationships with China.
Analysts correctly claim that BRICS is divided between anti-Western states and those that remain non-aligned. While the anti-Western camp, led by Russia, advocates a confrontational stance, non-aligned states, including India and Brazil, favor a nuanced approach.
They argue the US should try to develop closer relations with non-aligned countries to influence BRICS debates. But this overlooks the fact that China is not only the de-facto leader but also has an unequivocal strategy of favoring a nuanced approach towards the West.
Confrontational policy
This is based on multilateralism and free trade. So, despite what Russia may want, it is unlikely that the bloc will pursue a confrontational policy towards the West.
China knows that a non-confrontational approach is the best way to attract more countries and solidify the BRICS as a loose bloc that advocates for more democratic global governance. So far, this strategy appears to be working.
Gabriel Huland is a Teaching Fellow of the School of International Studies at the University of Nottingham in the UK.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of China Factor.