Xi Jinping will stop the rise of China – not Trump
‘The paradox of Xi’s supremacy is that he has made the country more vulnerable to turmoil and decline’
Donald Trump has called up anti-China hawks for his second coming as President of the United States. Yet, he will struggle to contain Beijing, given his own set of mounting problems.
They include the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, immigration, record levels of government debt and a ballooning budget deficit. Then there is America’s faltering infrastructure and escalating security threats.
Getting to grips with these problems will be a priority rather than taking on another external challenge. Fortunately for Trump, the threat from the People’s Republic of China is being blunted by an improbable “ally” operating at the highest level inside Beijing.
Xi Jinping has made a career of being an unlikely winner and is now the most powerful leader in the 75-year history of the Communist Party of China, surpassing even founder Mao Zedong.
If he stays the course, he could land his biggest and most far-fetched role yet as the man who stopped China’s rise. Xi would be doing Trump a huge favour without being asked.
Key allies
In surviving China’s cannibalistic politics, he played to his two biggest assets, his birthright and reputation, to exploit the CCP’s weak system of governance.
His main asset was perhaps his carefully cultivated reputation as being the least likely to make waves. He avoided offending the powerful while quietly nurturing a network of key allies on his way up.
He positioned himself as a loyal, competent, and obedient servant of the Party while hiding his ambitious streak and radical ideological leanings.
By staying above the constant factional bloodletting, he ended up in the most unlikely position as nobody’s enemy.
When China’s most powerful job of general secretary of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) became available, Xi was the default compromise candidate. Everyone felt safe or thought they were safe when they gave him the keys to the kingdom in 2012.
A decade later, Xi had reached a peak unscaled by any ruler in China’s political history.
He had control over 1.4 billion people, the world’s second-largest economy, its largest standing military, and a global surveillance reach comprising a network of spies supported by the best monitoring technology available.
He had dedicated his life to acquiring those powers for the purpose of turning China into the utopian communist state supposedly envisioned by Karl Marx, Mao and Confucius.
Under Xi, China would be “rejuvenated” to become the world’s leading superpower and go on to reshape the crumbling US-led international order for the good of all humanity.
Mounting problems
Yet, in 2025, China is showing few signs of rejuvenation. Instead, the supreme leader is struggling to hold his nerve in the face of the country’s mounting problems.
He is under pressure to perform miracles, such as wiping out “corruption” in politics and nurturing paradigm-shifting innovation and entrepreneurism in an authoritarian environment.
At the same time, he must motivate an increasingly demoralized workforce, and create “win-win” outcomes out of China’s difficult relationships with a host of countries in Asia, the Middle East, and Europe.
In promoting Chinese ascendancy, he has fanned both Western and Asian fears about the ‘China Threat’ and made Beijing a bigger target for the incoming Trump administration.
The paradox of Xi’s peak supremacy is that he has made the country more vulnerable to infighting, turmoil, and decline.
On the home front, he faces a host of immediate challenges largely of his own making, such as the damage inflicted on the economy by some of his arbitrary and nationalistic policies.
There is also growing international distrust of China amid rising tensions with the West and neighboring countries in Asia, as well as Beijing’s dubious neutrality in the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East.
Within the Party and the military, Xi has lost the fight to cover up their continuing power struggles, which means he is still facing open resistance. China’s youth are losing hope in their country’s future, while businesses and bureaucrats are afraid of taking risks.
China is also groaning under heavy debt from its overleveraged real estate sector, a population that is ageing, and uncertainty surrounding its much-touted tech sector.
The Wall Street Journal estimated that China’s households have lost a total of US$18 trillion in the country’s property meltdown since 2021.
Deflationary pressure
Despite Xi’s brave front, Beijing is deeply worried about the economy.
Last year, the regime launched a 10-trillion-yuan package (US$1.3 trillion) to deal with local government debt, while the central bank has announced major stimulus measures in an attempt to stave off deflationary pressure.
Whatever Xi is attempting, the Chinese economy will not return to the golden pre-Covid-19 era when it often grew by between 8% and 10% annually.
Millions of educated young people are “lying flat” in silent protest at their dwindling life prospects. Youth unemployment, mostly among university and high-school graduates, is dangerously high, between 15% to 18% during the past two years.
If Xi is unable to reverse the trend, he could face the prospect of social unrest from the young and educated in the coming years.
Equally concerning is the plight of 400 million “invisible” blue-collar workers, or about 29% of the population, who have long suffered from the lack of job security and social support.
Despite its much acclaimed economic miracle of the past decades, China still has a sizeable underclass of working poor.
Then there is China’s perennial scourge of capital flight, led by the wealthy and skilled. It is gaining momentum again while foreign companies have joined in the exodus at a time when China needs their investment to shore up economic confidence.
Globally, Xi’s policies have increasingly infuriated key partners such as the US, the European Union, G7 countries and what should be major Asian trading partners.
Mercantile trade practices and a rapid military build-up by the People’s Liberation Army Navy in the South and East China Sea have also left Beijing isolated.
Empty slogans
In short, Trump will encounter a very different China from the one he dealt with at the start of his first term in 2017. Xi is far less confident in 2025 than he was eight years ago as he struggles with the souring of his “Chinese Dream” that is now in full swing.
Not that Trump will have an easy time with America’s problems. But he will have a few advantages over Xi.
The US economy is in better shape than China’s. The world is once again looking to Washington for direction, having seen through Xi’s empty slogans.
Contrary to predictions about its demise, the US dollar has grown stronger on investor demand to reach a near two-year high against the rest of the world’s currencies.
While Xi has assumed the entire burden of government in his role as the “Chairman of Everything,” Trump can still count on America’s institutions, along with the country’s network of international allies.
Xi, meanwhile, is increasingly suspicious of his own hand-picked officials, witness the endless purges in China’s military establishment.
The poor state of Chinese governance, which allowed him to easily climb up the hierarchy, amass power, jail his critics, and change the country’s laws at will, is now his enemy.
As for Trump, he will face an increasingly anxious Xi if China’s economy continues to flounder and Beijing is unable to regain credibility on the world stage.
Like Mao, Xi could be tempted to take out his failings on the people and neighboring countries, with the island of Taiwan, particularly vulnerable.
Political instability
Trump did the hard part of turning mainstream USA against Xi’s China during his first act. For his second, he must strike a balance to allow the country to continue its decline while ensuring that it does not result in a collapse, leading to political instability.
Most importantly, Trump must rein in the Washington war hawks and their defense contractors who are eager for a new theater of conflict to open in Asia. An America-Sino war over flashpoints in the South China Sea or Taiwan would be catastrophic for all.
Ng Weng Hoong is a veteran journalist and writer who has devoted more than 30 years to covering developments in Asia, the Middle East, and North America.
This edited version of the article was originally published as a blog on WengCouver. Read the original here.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of China Factor.