Pakistan’s port in a storm creates a China, US dilemma

Pakistan’s politics continue to be marred by political, economic and security challenges since February’s general elections. The country’s most popular politician, Imran Khan, remains in jail and the coalition government lacks legitimacy.

The military also holds veto power over the government’s policies, while the country faces acute security challenges. Terrorist attacks have increased in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan since October.

They have targeted Chinese nationals working on critical infrastructure projects.

In September, leaked military and diplomatic documents claiming that Pakistan has privately agreed to grant China approval for a military base at the strategic port of Gwadar in Balochistan surfaced. 

Security problems

Both countries have denied these claims, but the accusation sheds light on Pakistan’s internal security problems and its delicate relations with China and the United States.

Islamabad’s foreign policy is under significant economic and geopolitical pressure.

While Pakistan shares military and investment ties with Washington, it has also cultivated a strong relationship with Beijing based on mutual animosity toward New Delhi.

US-Pakistan relations have deteriorated since the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. 

The Pakistani government and military’s attempts to repair ties have failed to yield dividends, such as securing a crucial International Monetary Fund or IMF package.

These diplomatic manoeuvres have visibly frustrated China, which views such overtures as a potential shift in allegiance to Washington.

Pakistan’s motivation behind approving a military base stems from its economic and security problems. Reliance on IMF loans keeps the economy afloat while mounting debt repayments have pushed Pakistan to renegotiate terms with China. 

Unlike previous years when Pakistan extracted strategic rent from the US which paid for its exports and military modernisation, the country now finds its geopolitical significance substantially diminished.

If Islamabad were to grant a military base to China, it would face a dilemma. Beijing’s access to the base could alleviate Pakistan’s economic crisis and ensure that a continuous supply of advanced military hardware enters the country. 

Militant groups

But it would also strain ties with the US and affect Pakistan’s strategic autonomy.

If a military base were to be approved, internal security challenges would also be exacerbated. Baloch insurgents and other militant groups could be encouraged to increase attacks targeting Chinese nationals and development infrastructure. 

The Balochistan Liberation Army views the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor as further marginalising the Baloch community. 

It could exploit the situation to strengthen regional sentiments, which have long viewed the Pakistani state as unfairly appropriating mineral and gas reserves.

Rising attacks on Chinese infrastructure projects and workers have prompted Beijing to push for a joint military strategy with Pakistan to safeguard citizens in the country.

Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan Jiang Zaidong has maintained that security threats are the primary constraint behind the slow progress of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. He has exhorted Islamabad to address this.

But his comments are unlikely to lead to a resolution, as there is little clarity on the role of Chinese guards in Pakistan if joint security were to be implemented. And whether they would be able to participate in combat operations in case of an attack.

There would be a score of foreign policy and internal security implications for Pakistan if the claims made by the Drop Site portal – based on leaked military and diplomatic documents – are accepted at face value. 

US relationship

The aim is not to assess the merits of these claims but to speculate about what implications such developments may have upon Pakistan’s relationship with the US, China and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.

Given this, it would not be prudent for Pakistan to take sides in the US-China rivalry.

This is set to intensify with the re-election of former US president Donald Trump even though Islamabad is unlikely to become a priority for the Trump cabinet.

Still, Washington would not wish for Pakistan to fall into China’s lap.

Muneeb Yousuf is the Deputy Editor of South Asia Research and a non-resident fellow at the Hong Kong Research Center for Asian Studies.

This article is republished from East Asia Forum under a Creative Commons license. Read the original here.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of China Factor.