Trump’s ‘America First’ plan and a new world order
The guardrails that constrained his first term have either been swept away or will be bent to his will
With a resounding victory in the United States presidential election, Donald Trump can now claim a sweeping mandate to implement his foreign and domestic agendas. Crucially, the result shows you should never bet against self-interest.
Whether that is either for politicians or for American voters prepared to disregard the most flawed of all characters in the hope he will “fix” their problems.
The guardrails that constrained Trump’s first term – a hostile Senate, opponents in the Republican Party, and a public service devoted to serve the nation rather than an individual – have either been swept away or will likely soon be bent to his will.
The global implications of a confident and unfettered Trump 2.0 will depend very much on what foreign policy path he charts and whom he decides to appoint to key positions.
Among those, we then need to watch who is selected to do his bidding and who will replace them when they inevitably fall out of favor. Early lists of potential appointees include:
- Marco Rubio and Richard Grenell, who have been mentioned as potential secretary of state
- Kash Patel, mooted as CIA director
- Mike Pompeo, the former secretary of state and CIA director during Trump’s first term in office, who may end up at the Pentagon as defense secretary.
Even Mike Flynn, Trump’s first national security adviser, who resigned just 22 days into his tenure after lying about contacts with Russia’s ambassador to the US, has been mentioned in discussions about senior roles.
So, too, has the self-styled strategic policy expert Elbridge Colby, a former US Defense Department official.
Trump will demand unswerving loyalty from his appointees, while claiming all the credit for their work. But, as he ages, he is also likely to rely heavily on them. With that in mind, here are three possible paths a Trump administration might take on the world stage.
1 | America First with compromises
Having trumpeted his credentials as a peacemaker, it is possible Trump returns the US to a position of isolationism and exceptionalism, essentially being a friend and enemy to no one.
That could mean either withdrawing completely from NATO, or making security assistance so conditional on transatlantic fealty that Europe is essentially captive to his whims.
It could also mean:
- Drawing down support for US alliances in Asia and the Pacific.
- Demanding ever-higher levels of defense spending from security partners.
- Running a critical eye over any deal that might require the US to commit the lion’s share of resources, or reduce its own military capabilities.
Australia, for instance, will be keen to extract assurances of White House support for the AUKUS partnership. This involves Canberra buying several nuclear-powered submarines in the early 2030s, in addition to technology sharing between the US and the United Kingdom.
This deal is almost certain to be scrutinized by the Trump administration, despite strong support from Republicans in the Congress and Senate. Yet, he would likely need to make trade-offs to achieve a more isolationist stance.
First, a grand bargain with Russia will be necessary. This is not simply because of his admiration for Vladimir Putin, but because he has promised to end the war in Ukraine swiftly.
Although Moscow ultranationalists are gleefully crowing about Trump’s victory, the Biden administration is scrambling to get US$6 billion in military assistance to Kyiv before the handover over power in January.
Hence, Trump can’t immediately count on Ukrainian weakness as a precursor to a peace settlement. Second, in the medium term, it may require a bargain with China.
An endless trade war based on tit-for-tat tariffs will drive inflation higher in the US and bite into Trump’s blue-collar, rural voting base.
2 | A muscular pivot to Asia
Repeated calls by Trump’s national security loyalists for a confrontational approach to China, coupled with his frustration with European allies, who he believes are free-riding on American defense spending, may lead him to pivot to Asia instead.
Still, this would entail an even deeper bargain with Moscow. It would have to not only include a deal to end the Ukraine war, but also a more holistic agreement to downscale US-Russian confrontation.
While it is by no means guaranteed Putin would be amenable to this, it would free up US resources to confront China militarily as well as economically.
Trump’s new administration will include many Beijing hawks like Trump loyalist Colby, who have been arguing for years that China poses the gravest threat to American power.
But this pathway will require a commitment by Trump. It will also require more concrete security guarantees to its allies in the Asia-Pacific region – in exchange for their commitment to not only help constrain China but be prepared to participate in a potential conflict.
If Trump does abandon NATO, it remains to be seen how even its closest Asian partners would regard his commitment to their security or his ability to manage crises in the region.
3 | Peace through strength
A third option would be for Trump to channel former US President Ronald Reagan, seeking to restore and maintain global US primacy. America would lead, but do so pragmatically and with allies whose interests aligned with its own.
This would be a considerable undertaking, not to mention a costly one. It would require hefty military spending, investment in research and development, reestablishing American dominance in critical technologies, and finding alternative solutions to China’s supply chains.
It would also mean doubling down on strategic competition and being prepared to substantially arm proxies, and not just allies, to pressure Beijing. But even this would have limits. As Trump has demonstrated, he regards national interests and personal ones as the same thing.
A desire to give Israel a completely free hand, for instance, will have to be moderated by his extensive ties to Saudi Arabia, although Riyadh would certainly approve of his desire to crack down hard on Iran. And how Trump deals with dictators will also come under scrutiny.
In the past, his open admiration for Putin, Chinese leader Xi Jinping and North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un has given America’s partners pause. It has also constrained Trump from achieving his objectives.
Chaos and change
Either one of these pathways will lead to instability and tough choices for America’s partners. Putin will likely make Trump earn any peace over Ukraine by simply refusing to negotiate until the White House puts sufficient pressure on Kyiv to capitulate.
And peace on Russian terms will be fragile, entail painful Ukrainian concessions, spawn bitter insurgent campaigns and critically weaken European security.
Europe now finds itself at a crossroads. It finally has to confront the prospect of being responsible for its security and defense against a reinvigorated Russia. It will now have to work quickly, spend far more on defense and overcome its crippling institutional inertia.
This will also accelerate the new European security order that is already taking shape, with Poland, the Baltic and Nordic states, and the UK as the main bulwarks against Russia.
In Asia and the Pacific, questions about America’s commitment to security guarantees will drive local arms races and make nuclear proliferation more likely. Countries like Japan, South Korea, Australia and the Philippines will also need to ramp up efforts to work together.
The upshot? Trust, common values and a commitment to a stable rules-based order are what have sustained and deepened America’s security partnerships.
At the very least, Trump 2.0 will make most US allies wary for the foreseeable future. But the greatest tragedy of all would be if he proceeds with his promised campaign of revenge against internal enemies, deporting millions and using his mandate to create a Potemkin democracy.
I fervently hope that doesn’t happen. But then again, you should never bet against self-interest.
Matthew Sussex is an Associate Professor at the Griffith Asia Institute and a Fellow at the Strategic and Defense Studies Centre at the Australian National University.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of China Factor.