How Chinese and Russian disinformation can flourish

The spread of disinformation is one of the biggest risks to societies. Recent examples have been conspiracy narratives about Covid-19 vaccinations and false claims about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The trend is linked partly to competition among world powers.

It is also being played out in Africa, too.

Across the continent, multiple foreign powers, including China, France, Russia, the United States, and others, are competing to shape public opinion. In most cases, states use legitimate approaches to get their messages across.

But there are many examples of the spread of false narratives about current affairs.

For example, in 2020, Meta revealed that the French military was behind an online campaign to sway public opinion in the Central African Republic against Russia. And in 2022, the US was accused of leading a disinformation campaign targeting Arab-speaking communities.

False information

There is evidence that Russian operatives are active spreaders of false information across the Sahel. China has also used its state-controlled media to present strategic narratives on the African continent. Some are true and some are false.

Essentially stories, they are used by political actors to promote their interests and values and shape how people perceive global events. The question then arises, what factors influence the success of strategic narratives?

In a study, we looked at how prevalent Russian and Chinese strategic narratives are. We also explain what makes them popular.

Our findings are based on a survey of 4,600 people in four African countries – Angola, Ethiopia, South Africa, and Zambia – at the end of 2022. We selected the countries because they have very different political landscapes and different experiences with foreign influence.

We found that most people believed Russian and Chinese strategic disinformation narratives to be true. The main reason they did so was anti-US sentiment.

That is, the more somebody felt the US was an enemy or had a negative influence on their country, the more likely they were to say Chinese and Russian narratives were true.

These findings also matter for counter-disinformation strategies. When strategic narratives capitalise on deep-seated attitudes, histories, and alliances, mere debunking of disinformation by means of fact-checking or media literacy campaigns is unlikely to succeed on its own.

Our study builds on previous research and its impact on public opinion in the Global South. It had already identified the reasons why some people share disinformation, what people from different backgrounds do when they come across it, and what can be done to curb its spread.

Negative aspects

In our latest study, we found that Russia’s media often portrayed the country as a defender of sovereignty and traditional values, painting the West as hypocritical or imperialistic.

Similarly, Chinese media – CGTN, China Daily and Xinhua – emphasised China’s role as a partner in Africa’s development while denying negative aspects of Beijing’s influence.

We found that Russian narratives were more widely accepted than Chinese ones across all countries. We asked respondents whether two statements that were examples of Russia’s disinformation narrative were true. The statements were:

• The war in Ukraine is a consequence of Nato’s expansion in Eastern Europe.
• Sanctions against Russia are the main cause for food and energy crises.

More than 70% of survey respondents told us that they thought the statements were probably or definitely true. Several fact-checking organisations have shown that these narratives are not true, but are commonly used by Moscow to advance its own strategic interests.

Support for Chinese and Russian strategic narratives

Chinese narratives were more polarising and offered the most striking differences between countries. When asked, “If a war breaks out in Taiwan, it would be the United States’ fault.” Only 3 in 10 Zambians said that it was true, compared to 6 in 10 Ethiopians.

Differences between countries were much smaller when we looked at this statement: “Foreign forces organised anti-government protests in Hong Kong in 2019.”

Only in South Africa and Ethiopia did we find more than 50% of people believing this to be true. One way to interpret these differences is by looking at the wider geopolitical alignment in each country at the time the survey was conducted.

In South Africa, despite the blocking of Russia Today or RT on the satellite TV service provider DStv in 2022, Moscow’s narratives still found significant support.

Memory diplomacy

This was likely influenced by the country’s membership of BRICS, a bloc which also includes Brazil, Russia, India, and China, as well as the government’s refusal to side with the West in condemning Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine.

Russia also draws on “memory diplomacy” by reminding African audiences of its past support for liberation movements such as the African National Congress to boost support for its war.

South Africa is seen to drift away from its neutral stance towards stronger support for Russia and China. Russian media plans to capitalise on this by opening a bureau in Johannesburg.

In contrast, Zambia and Angola displayed more resistance to foreign narratives. Angola’s historical ties with Russia, dating back to the Cold War, did not translate into strong support for its narratives, as the country diversifies its international partnerships.

In Ethiopia, a key driver appears to be anti-US sentiment. We found that 33% of Ethiopians believed the US to be an “enemy,” compared to 4% in Angola or 8% in Zambia. Also, 65% thought US influence was negative, compared to 17% in Angola or 22% in Zambia.

Perceived influence of the United States in each country

Anti-US rhetoric has been prevalent in Ethiopian media and the political landscape in general in recent years after Washington’s criticism of the war in Tigray.

We concluded that anti-US sentiment was the most consistent predictor of believing Russian and Chinese strategic narratives. In other words, those who saw Washington in a negative light were much more likely to believe these narratives to be true.

We also found that the consumption of Chinese or Russian media had no effect on people supporting these narratives. China and Russia have invested heavily in media content on the continent, but their audience and the impact of their media messages remain low.

Our research highlights the nuanced and complex ways in which public opinion forms across Africa. Disinformation does not operate in a vacuum. It is shaped by historical ties, economic dependencies, and the local political landscape.

Positive attitudes

Counter-strategies would therefore have to include a focus on building positive attitudes and strengthening geopolitical ties to reduce the susceptibility to disinformation narratives.

Dani Madrid-Morales is a lecturer in journalism and global communication at the University of Sheffield in England. Herman Wasserman is a professor of journalism at Stellenbosch University in South Africa. Saifuddin Ahmed is an assistant professor of communication and information at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of China Factor.