Cuba’s a flashpoint in China’s rivalry with the US

Last month, the Center for Strategic and International Studies released a report suggesting that China is developing sophisticated listening posts on the Caribbean island of Cuba. 

Both Washington and Beijing promptly discounted the story with neither wanting a major crisis amid already tense relations. But China and Cuba are likely to continue to draw closer for geopolitical reasons. 

The United States plays a major role in China’s backyard, such as Taiwan and the South China Sea, while Beijing is demonstrating that it can do the same with Cuba. The deeper the engagement in Havana, the more complicated the geopolitical landscape.

It reinforces the view among policymakers in the US and China that the two powers are locked in a new Cold War in which Cuba could become a flashpoint. Sino-Cuban relations have a long and complicated history. 

While the Chinese Communist Party under Mao Zedong and the Communist Party of Cuba under Fidel Castro had a high level of ideological compatibility, complemented by strong antipathy for the US, economic factors dominated.

Weak economy

After taking power in 1959, the Castro regime was hobbled by an American economic embargo, with many of the government’s initiatives ending in failure. 

Despite these problems, from 1959 to 1989 the economy grew at an average rate of around 4% per year with considerable help from the Soviet Union. By the late 1980s, the Soviet Union was providing US$4 billion annually to keep the dysfunctional regime in power.

China had its own challenges during that period, including regime consolidation, ongoing threats from the ousted Nationalist government in Taiwan, and the Korean War. It was also struggling with a weak economy and tense relations with its main patron, the Soviet Union.

As the Sino-Soviet split intensified in the 1970s, Castro’s need for Soviet economic assistance strained ties with Beijing. It was not until the 1990s that China-Cuba relations thawed. 

At that point the Soviet Union had dissolved, Cuba’s economy had hit a new low due to the loss of aid and China had become a rapidly rising economic power.

Beijing and Havana have a great deal in common. Both are left-wing authoritarian regimes, regard the US as their primary security threat, and are ruled by communist parties. 

Cuba also offers China something difficult to replicate – location, sitting less than 150 kilometers from the US mainland. This proximity is why the idea of Chinese listening posts is such a sensitive issue.

To US policymakers, Beijing’s involvement in the Caribbean is seen as a significant threat.

China’s actions in Cuba mirror the US approach in Taiwan and the South China Sea. Taiwan, less than 150 kilometers from the Chinese mainland, recently acknowledged that the United States has a small number of troops in its territory, mainly for training purposes.

China’s potential presence in Cuba would also create a strategic threat to the US, putting at risk critical supply chains, ports, and other facilities in the case of a conflict over Taiwan.

Joint declaration

There is also a diplomatic attraction in cultivating Havana. China has benefited from Cuban support in international forums, such as the United Nations.

In 2020, it wrote the joint declaration on behalf of 45 countries “in support of China’s counter-terrorism and deradicalization measures in Xinjiang.”

Cuba also benefits significantly from its Chinese connection. Although it has not invested heavily in the island as it has in other Latin American countries, China remains a key trade partner and plays a role in the Caribbean country’s petrochemical and infrastructure projects. 

It also buys Cuban zinc and nickel, materials critical to the global energy transition. Beijing has consistently advocated ending the US economic embargo and welcomed the Caribbean country into the Belt and Road Initiative in 2018. 

The countries’ top officials often meet, and during the Covid-19 pandemic the two countries actively cooperated in healthcare affairs. In 2024, China sent food and medical equipment to the island, both of which are in short supply. 

Beijing has also helped the Havana government in enhancing population surveillance. Chinese companies including Huawei, TP-Link, and ZTE built the island’s telecommunications infrastructure.

The Cuban government uses it to control its population. In 2021, when the island erupted into widespread protests sparked by dire economic conditions, Havana used Chinese technology to shut down the country’s internet.

Looking ahead, if Sino-American relations further deteriorate, Beijing could be tempted to accelerate its engagement with Havana. This would include greater economic assistance and a closer military arrangement.  

The United States presidential election in November will set the tone for US-Cuba relations. A win for Vice President Kamala Harris could see an easing of tensions between Havana and Washington.

Private sector

It would leave the door open for the Caribbean island to be less dependent on Beijing. A second term for Donald Trump could see a stricter policy, driving Cuba closer to China – and perhaps Russia, which sent a small naval flotilla in June.

China could also help push economic reform in Cuba, which is parked in a cul-de-sac. Beijing’s own experience in allowing a relatively large private sector to function has real relevance.

Ultimately, the China-Cuba relationship will reflect the state of play between Beijing and Washington, meaning the China-Cuba-US triangle will carry more weight in global geopolitical affairs unless handled with care.

Scott B MacDonald is the chief economist for Smith’s Research and Gradings and a Fellow at the Caribbean Policy Consortium.

This article is republished from East Asia Forum under a Creative Commons license. Read the original here.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of China Factor.