Former Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao once remarked that “any small problem multiplied by 1.3 billion will end up being a very big problem, and a very big aggregate divided by 1.3 billion will come to a very tiny figure.”
This observation aptly describes the outcome of China’s response to Covid-19. Boasting its lowest fatality rate, Chinese leaders acclaimed their response as a “major decisive victory” and a “miracle in human history.”
Professor Minxin Pei commented that the surge in deaths represented “the most lethal event in peacetime China since the 1959-61 famine that followed the Great Leap Forward.”
Interestingly, once the viral wave subsided in February, Chinese media barely mentioned the pandemic, as if it had never occurred. Yet, its shadow lingers.
This is not only due to the continued spread of Covid-19 in China but also because of an immunity gap between it and other background infectious diseases.
Starting in May, China saw a spike in respiratory illnesses caused by multiple pathogens, including influenza, respiratory syncytial virus, or RSV, and mycoplasma pneumonia.
The World Health Organization, concerned about undiagnosed pneumonia clusters in children in northern China, publicly requested more information from the country.
Recent reports of reintroduced health codes and mandatory PCR tests in hospitals have rekindled fears of a return to the old policy.
Covid-19 has also cast a long shadow over China’s economy. Scrapping Beijing’s previous strategy raised hopes of a rapid economic rebound.
What followed was a real estate sector meltdown, highlighted by the arrest of the billionaire tycoon of property giant Evergrande, collapsing foreign direct investment, and a decline in international trade.
The unprecedentedly high youth unemployment rate added to the gloom.
The lackluster economy raised questions about whether China has peaked. To bolster the economy, Beijing issued 1 trillion yuan, or US$137 billion, in sovereign bonds and allowed local governments to use part of their 2024 quota in advance.
In November, the International Monetary Fund, or IMF, upgraded China’s 2023 GDP growth forecast from 5% to 5.4%.
Still, the zero-Covid fiasco has made the country harder to govern. Plagued by overspending, colossal “hidden debts”, and dwindling revenues, cash-strapped local governments struggle to provide public goods and services.
In February, hundreds of retired workers in Wuhan and Dalian protested government cuts to their medical benefit allowance.
Driven in part by rising premiums and co-payments, China’s state-subsidized health insurance schemes lost 17 million subscribers in 2023. These challenges did not disrupt the power transition in China, though.
In March, Xi Jinping secured a third five-year term as China’s president and cemented his influence by appointing allies and protégés to key positions in the State Council.
They included Premier Li Qiang, Foreign Minister Qin Gang, and Defense Minister Li Shangfu. Both Qin Gang and Li Shangfu were later sacked after vanishing from public life for months.
The unexplained purge of two Xi loyalists, along with the mysterious disappearance of top rocket force commanders, signaled potential regime instability.
There are also indications that the once-admired Chinese model is losing its allure.
The country is expected to see the world’s biggest millionaire exodus this year, while the number of Chinese nationals apprehended crossing the US-Mexico border into the United States is more than in the previous 10 years combined.
On the foreign policy front, China’s economic slowdown has not hindered its global ambitions. In June, China brokered a peace deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
It also positioned itself as a mediator in the Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Hamas conflicts. Its influence remains strong in lower and middle-income countries.
The US-China rivalry intensified during the pandemic and continued through 2023.
Negative perceptions of China in the United States reached new highs, with 83% of adults holding unfavorable views of the country.
Partly due to the worsening relationship, American students studying in Chinese universities dropped to the lowest level in decades, and the weekly number of round-trip flights allowed to operate between the two countries is only about 20% of the pre-pandemic level.
In October, President Joe Biden’s administration escalated its chip war with new restrictions on advanced computer semiconductors.
Yet there was a silver lining in the cloud. Following the balloon incident, the Biden administration shifted focus to maintaining strategic communication and de-risking with China.
These exchanges have injected positive dynamics into the bilateral relationship, resulting in agreements to operationalize working group mechanisms for economic and financial matters, as well as countering narcotics, enhancing climate action, and addressing regional and maritime issues.
Looking ahead to 2024, China faces numerous challenges and uncertainties.
This less-than-rosy economic outlook looms large for Chinese leaders, especially in the lead-up to the 75th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic in October – a milestone meant for celebration, not concern.
The future performance of China’s economy hinges critically on its policy space, now seemingly hemmed in by its rigid political system.
Moreover, external developments like the 2024 Taiwan and US presidential elections will shape the trajectory of cross-strait and American-Sino relations, as well as China’s internal transition.
As the clock ticks towards 2024, the interplay of internal politics and external pressures could either generate new policy space for China or further tighten the existing binds, setting the stage for a defining year in its history.
Yanzhong Huang is a senior fellow for global health at the Council on Foreign Relations, where he directs the Global Health Governance roundtable series.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of China Factor.