Satellite Wars and the battle to dominate space
Leaked Pentagon documents highlight the dangers of sophisticated cyber attacks in out-of-this-world conflicts
Leaked Pentagon documents have suggested that China is developing sophisticated cyber attacks for the purpose of disrupting military communication satellites.
While this is unconfirmed, it is certainly possible, as many sovereign nations and private companies have considered how to protect from signal interference.
Nearly every aspect of our lives is enabled by satellite communication, from financial transactions, navigation, weather prediction, and internet services to more remote locations.
Yet given how many satellites are in orbit, while the effect might be felt on some of the population, if one or two were lost there would not be major problems.
But when we consider the military benefits of satellites, immediate communication is vital for early warning systems and tracking. So how easy would it be to disrupt these services?
The Chinese space program has been advancing at a faster rate than that of any other country.
Success rate
China’s first successful launch was in 1970, but in 1999 its space program leaped forward with the Shenzhou-1 launch, which was the first in a series of unmanned, then manned, space missions of increasing sophistication.
Beijing conducted more than 200 launches between 2010 and 2019. Last year, it set a record with 53 rocket launches – with an incredible 100% success rate.
As such, the Chinese National Space Administration (CNSA) has become a major player in global space activity and has a great deal of experience with satellite communications.
The leaked documents suggest that the Chinese are looking for the capability to “seize control of a satellite, rendering it ineffective to support communications, weapons, or intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems.”
It’s also quite possible that the United States and other nations might also be developing such capabilities. Satellites orbit our planet at a range of altitudes.
The lowest stable orbits are around 300 kilometers, the International Space Station and the Hubble Space Telescope sit at 500 km altitude, and geostationary satellites are around 36,000 km up – about six times the radius of the Earth.
The idea of physically capturing or taking over a satellite has been considered a largely impossible task, although it has featured, famously, in films such as You Only Live Twice, where a large orbiting cylinder swallowed a manned spacecraft.
Smaller craft designed to remove space debris from orbit have been launched in the past few years. But the practical challenges of capturing a fully working and operating satellite are far greater – particularly due to the recoil of firing harpoons.
Still, there are methods of disrupting and even taking over satellite communication. Below are three options:
1 | Saturation
This is the easiest method. Satellites communicate by broadcasting on a specific set of radio or microwave frequencies. By bombarding the receiving station, or the satellite itself, you can effectively drown out the signal. It is particularly effective with positioning information.
2 | Jamming
This is a method of diverting the communication signal from reaching the satellite or the ground control station. This requires high-power signals to fool one or the other. This method of interference works best when the jamming source contains no information, so the receiver assumes there is no data transmission – a human would hear silence or just a tone.
3 | Command sending
This is an infinitely more tricky procedure. The original signal needs to be silenced or overpowered and the replacement signal must be able to accurately communicate and fool a satellite. This usually requires knowing the encryption key that would be used, as well as the correct commands and syntax. This sort of information cannot be easily guessed, meaning knowledge of the launch systems and companies is required.
To make these three techniques easier to understand, imagine you are at a restaurant and your partner is sitting opposite you.
You are talking to them normally and then the background music gets turned up really loud. You may be able to make out some words but not everything. This would be saturation.
Now the waiter comes past and starts talking loudly at you taking your attention away. This would be jamming.
Then your partner goes to the toilet and you receive a call that appears to be from them but is actually from somebody who has taken their phone and is impersonating them. This would be command sending.
This final example is infinitely more difficult to achieve but has the most potential for disruption. If you can trick a satellite into thinking you are the true command source, then not only are communications blocked but false information can be sent to the ground stations.
Finally, when a satellite does go out of communication, we refer to it as a zombie satellite. Essentially it cannot do any of its intended tasks and just orbits with little chance of recovery.
This can happen naturally when the Sun releases large amounts of energetic-charged particles that can interact with satellites causing electrical surges. In some cases, this results in untrustworthy data, but can also wipe out communications.
Hijacking signals
The most famous case was the Galaxy 15 telecommunications satellite, which lost ground station communication in 2010 but continued to broadcast communications to customers.
While the military cannot replicate this, the hijacking of signals is possible. The leaked document does not provide any proof of China’s capabilities, or indeed the United States’ current advancement in this field.
All we can say is that our understanding of atmospheric physics and wave propagation in the upper atmosphere is likely to increase rapidly as this becomes more and more important.
Ian Whittaker is a Senior Lecturer in Physics at Nottingham Trent University in the United Kingdom.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of China Factor.