This article was produced by Globetrotter.
Washington has sought to reaffirm its commitment to its allies and partners following the chaotic departure by the United States from Afghanistan in 2021 and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine earlier this year.
US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan on August 2 soothed nerves in Taipei and underlined the island’s status as a key component of the US Pacific strategy.
The affair also generated a rare instance of US bipartisanship. Twenty-six Republican senators backed Pelosi’s trip, while on August 14, a team of lawmakers from the Democratic and Republican parties visited the island.
The Republican governor of Indiana, Eric Holcomb, also made a trip to Taiwan on August 22.
China’s Foreign Ministry warned of “serious consequences” before Pelosi’s visit. But even after continual trips by US politicians to Taiwan, Beijing is unlikely to pursue military escalation.
Doing so could result in a repeat of the 1995-1996 Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, which led to a remarkable loss of face for the Chinese leadership.
The third crisis started when then-Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui was granted a visa by the US in 1995 to attend a reunion at Cornell University.
Hosting the Taiwanese leader was seen as a serious provocation by China, instigating a series of missile tests and Chinese troop buildup over the next few months.
In response, Washington steadily built up its military power in the Asia-Pacific region, including “[sending] two aircraft carrier battle groups to the area” in March 1996.
Chinese missile tests concluded days later, with Beijing being forced to accept US military dominance in the region, and it could do little but protest when then-Speaker Newt Gingrich visited Taiwan in 1997.
The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis generated great interest in Russia, which saw an opportunity to exploit Beijing’s desire to push back against Washington.
Writing in 1996, Russian military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer stated that defense contracts with China “could become not only a way for our hapless military-industrial complex to preserve jobs and earn money, but also the start of a long-range strategic partnership and a new balance of forces in Asia that would favor Russia.”
Having already accelerated since the Soviet collapse, Russia rapidly increased its weapons exports to China after the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis.
This helped rejuvenate the Russian arms industry and has allowed it to maintain its status as the second-largest weapons exporter up through today.
As Washington’s attention turned to the Middle East following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, China gained increasing access to Russian-built missile systems, aircraft, ships, and other military technology.
Initially, those imports were largely limited to Soviet-era weaponry. But as China’s domestic production capabilities evolved, Russia has offered more advanced and sophisticated shipments of arms over the last decade to ensure China remains a customer.
It has also helped undermine US strategy in the Asia-Pacific region.
As a result, Taiwan and US forces in this area have become far more vulnerable to Chinese missiles, aircraft, and ships.
After Pelosi’s departure, China conducted multiple missile tests near the island, while two aircraft carriers, commissioned in 2012 and 2019, were both sent to the region. On August 21 alone, five Chinese ships and 12 aircraft were detected around Taiwan.
China also indicated that it intends to conduct “regular combat readiness patrols.”
The Biden administration was careful to avoid condoning Pelosi’s visit, instead advocating for calm.
Although in the weeks leading up to her trip, the US Navy had sent its warships through the Taiwan Strait on several occasions “in what it calls freedom of navigation operations,” since Pelosi’s return, Washington has been wary of escalation.
It has kept “an aircraft carrier group and two amphibious assault ships at sail in the region, but not close to the island,” rather than retaliating against China’s recent exercises in the region.
On August 12, US Indo-Pacific coordinator Kurt Campbell said that the US plans to cautiously resume its trade and military presence in the Taiwan Strait only in line with its previous “commitment to freedom of navigation” in the coming weeks.
Already preoccupied with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the American military cannot risk confronting China as it could a quarter-century ago.
Though Beijing has so far avoided significant escalation, China’s growing defense capabilities have allowed it to aid the Russian military’s campaign in the Eastern European country.
Since the beginning of the invasion, China has increased sales of microchips, aluminum oxide, and raw materials essential to the Russian defense industry. In June, several Chinese companies were also blacklisted by Washington for aiding the Russian military.
It has modified large numbers of Chinese civilian drones and robots, as they are cheaper and more widely available than Russian variants, to supplement the efforts of its armed forces.
But surveillance technology developed by DJI, called AeroScope, can be used to track other DJI aircraft along with the position of the drone’s operator, and Ukrainian experts have indicated that Russia continues to use AeroScope to target the country’s forces.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s criticism of Pelosi’s visit as a “thoroughly planned provocation” and including Taiwan on its list of unfriendly countries and territories in March means Beijing may continue to look the other way on the issue of using Chinese-made civilian drones in the Russia-Ukraine war.
And in addition to growing technological collaboration, Chinese and Russian militaries have also deepened operational integration over the last two decades.
Their first joint military exercise was held in 2003, and dozens of others have taken place around the world since then. China also plans to take part in the Vostok military exercises –alongside India, Mongolia, Belarus, and Tajikistan – in Russia’s Far East from August 30 to September 5.
There are numerous limitations, however, to greater military cooperation between these two powers. China is wary of comparisons between the Ukraine-Russia war and its own dispute with Taiwan.
China also does not want to jeopardize its relatively constructive relationship with Ukraine, nor risk Western economic sanctions by more openly supporting Moscow.
Certain Russian firms have also criticized China’s weapons technology theft, while Chinese arms exports have begun to threaten Moscow’s market share among its traditional customers. These factors reflect the distrust between Moscow and Beijing that has existed for decades.
Still, the mutual opposition of China and Russia toward the US is enough to offset these issues for now. Washington had earlier warned Beijing against assisting Moscow’s war effort, but clearly, it is a line China is willing to skirt.
Military cooperation between China and Russia has been further augmented by growing energy sales between the two countries, as well as a desire to create international institutions, like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and independent financial payment systems, to bypass traditional US-dominated structures.
The Beijing-Moscow relationship was reinvigorated just weeks before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine with the declaration of a “no limits” partnership.
Both countries increasingly recognize that dividing US attention between Ukraine and Taiwan will allow China and Russia to consolidate their regional positions.
The muted US response to Chinese military action around Taiwan is yet another indication that Washington cannot confront Russia and China simultaneously, particularly as they grow into a more united front.
If tensions over Taiwan continue, China may be convinced to increase its military support to Russia. If this happens, it will upend the military balance in Eastern Europe, just as Russian military assistance to China has done in East Asia over the last two decades.
John P Ruehl is an Australian-American journalist living in Washington. He is a contributing editor to Strategic Policy and a contributor to several other foreign affairs publications. He is currently finishing a book on Russia to be published in 2022.
This article was produced by Globetrotter.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of China Factor.